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"No Place Like Home": The Search for a
Legal Framework for Cohabitants and the
Family Home in Canada and Britain
Heather Conway* and Philip Girard*
The family home is more than simply an economic asset or a means of shelter. It is uniquely
connected to one's 'personhood interests. " Tbe law in Canada and Britain recognizes this by
giving married spouses special rights of possession or title in the family home, but the
corresponding rights of the rising number of unmarried cohabitants are found in a patchwork
of common law and legislation. The law has a deep-rooted tendency to value property interests
above "family" considerations, and the emerging trend toward "familialization" of property
law applies mainly to married couples. Tbere is an inherent tension in attempting to secure
equal rights for unmarried cohabitants while recognizing that the choice to remain unmarried
is an important aspect of one's autonomy.
The authors examine how these tensions are manifested in the current law in Canada and
Britain. They then analyze reform proposals and reform legislation in both countries, as well
as the potential influence of constitutional equality provisions and human rights legislation.
Tbey conclude that while an autonomy-based approach to the division of cohabitants'property
has some merit, familial considerations should prevail where the family home is concerned.
The functional similarities between cohabitants and married persons become stronger the
longer the relationship lasts, especially where children are involved. These similarities provide
afirm basis for similar legal treatment where tbe family home is concerned. The emergence of
same-sex marriage in Canada and civil unions for same-sex couples in Britain will bring some
clarity to the law. Further action is needed, however, to provide a framework for the
resolution of disputes over the family home of cohabitants, whether same-sex or opposite-sex,
who choose not to formalize their relationships.
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Introduction
"Family" and "home" are two of the most evocative words in the
English language. Conjoining them into "family home" raises the
emotional stakes even higher. More than the simple idea of shelter, the
phrase "family home" connotes safety, security, continuity, a sense of
place and even of identity. The family home is a unique locus of what
many scholars call "personhood interests"-those particularly connected
to a person's sense of identity and place in the world.' As the Alberta
Law Reform Institute has observed, "the home is a place of special
significance; it is not just another asset accumulated over a lifetime."2 In
addition to its emotional significance, the family home also usually
represents the single most important economic asset owned by most
couples.
1. See e.g. Margaret Jane Radin, "Property and Personhood" (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957;
Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993); Ronald Paul Hill, "Homeless Women, Special Possessions, and the Meaning of
'Home': An Ethnographic Case Study" (1991) 18 J. of Consumer Research 298; Lorna
Fox, "The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?" (2002) 29
J.L. & Soc'y 580.
2. Alberta Law Reform Institute, The Matrimonial Home (Edmonton: Alberta Law
Reform Institute, 1995) at 5, online: < http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/pdfs/
reports-disc/rfd014.pdf> [Matrimonial Home].
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
The law governing married persons in Canada and Britain has been
influenced by these social facts in creating important rights for spouses,
and in some cases their children, in the home. These rights in what is
significantly known as the "matrimonial home" in law run regardless of
the state of title. These rights, which may relate to possession, title or
both, arise during marriage, upon death, and upon divorce or a
separation expected to be permanent. By contrast, the rights of
unmarried couples, or "cohabitants,"3 are left to a sometimes confusing
patchwork of common law and legislative remedies that has been the
target of much criticism.4 In both countries, a significant rise in the
number of cohabiting couples, and in the proportion of children born to
such couples, means that the time is long past when such questions
could be dismissed as marginal.' Deciding whether change is needed and,
if so, what form it should take, raises many difficult questions. To what
extent is the decision not to marry an assertion of "autonomy" from the
legal regime governing marriage? To what extent should constitutional
guarantees of equal treatment inform decisions about the law governing
3. We use the term "cohabitants" in this article to include both heterosexual and
homosexual couples living together in a conjugal-style relationship. Any differences
which arise in the relevant law as between these two groups are indicated accordingly.
4. For an English perspective, see Louise Tee, "Division of Property Upon Relationship
Breakdown" in Jonathan Herring, ed., Family Law: Issues, Debates, Policy (Devon: Willan
Publishing, 2001); Anne Barlow (with contributions from David Josiah-Lake),
Cohabitants and the Law, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001). In Canada see generally
Winifred Holland, "Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of
Marriage and Cohabitation?" (2000) 17 Can. J. Farn. L. 114; Berend Hovius, "Property
Division for Unmarried Cohabitees in the Common Law Provinces" (2004) 21 Can. Fain.
L.Q. 175. Similar critiques are made in Quebec; see Dominique Goubau, Ghislain Otis &
David Robitaille, "La spcificit6 patrimoniale de l'union de fait: le libre choix et ses
'dommages collateraux'" (2003) Cahiers de Droit 3.
5. In Canada, the proportion of opposite-sex couples residing together without being
married went from 6% in 1981 to 14% twenty years later; Statistics Canada data as cited
by Nicholas Bala, "Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage
and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships" (2003) 29 Queen's L.J. 41 [Bala,
"Controversy"] at 45. The proportion of children born to unmarried parents varies
significantly by region in Canada, from 29% in Nova Scotia to over half in Quebec in the
1990s; Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Final Report: Reform of the Law Dealing
with Matrimonial Property in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Law Reform Commission of Nova
Scotia, 1997) at 10-11.
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married and unmarried couples? Would legislative provision for the
registration of civil unions solve the problems in the current law? If the
law governing property relations between cohabitants is to be reformed,
should property law, family law, or some combination of both provide
the framework for reform?
Much of the Canadian and British literature that is critical of the
current state of the law regarding cohabitants' property does not
distinguish between the family home and other assets. However, we
restrict our analysis to the family home, arguing that the policy
considerations supporting non-intervention with respect to cohabitants'
assets on relationship breakdown should not apply where the family
home is concerned. In both Canada and Britain, there is some tentative
movement towards distinguishing the family home from other types of
assets. However, there is a lack of consensus as to how this might be
achieved. This article compares and contrasts the different legal
approaches emerging in both jurisdictions. A number of recent events
provide the starting point for our discussion: in Britain, the release of
the Law Commission's discussion paper on Sharing Homes6 and the
recently enacted Civil Partnership Act 2004;' in Canada, the Supreme
Court judgment in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh;8 and the
decision of the Canadian government to proceed with legislation
authorizing same-sex marriage' in light of court decisions declaring
unconstitutional the restriction of marriage to heterosexuals."0
6. U.K., The Law Commission, Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (No. 278) (London:
Law Commission, 2002), online: The Law Commission <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/
files/lc278.pdf> [Sharing Homes].
7. (U.K.), 2004, c. 33.
8. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2002 SCC 83 [Walsh cited to S.C.R.].
9. Bill C-38, An Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage for civil
purposes, 1st Sess., 38th ParI., 2005 (First Reading, February 1st, 2005).
10. Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472, 2003
BCCA 251 (B.C.C.A.); Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161,
225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (C.A.). The government of Canada announced it would not appeal
the rulings and referred draft legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court
handed down its decision in December 2004; Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage 246 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, 2004 SCC 79.
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
On the surface, these events may appear unrelated. Sharing Homes, for
example, examined the property rights of all those who share homes,
and was not restricted to those in intimate or conjugal relationships. It
was not drafted with a view to providing proposals for legislative
reform, but merely as a "framework for future public debate and
consideration by Government."" The Commission concluded that "it
[was] not possible to devise a statutory scheme for the determination of
shares in the shared home which can operate fairly and evenly across all
the diverse circumstances which are now to be encountered."' 2 Walsh,
on the other hand, dealt with a claim by a common-law partner that the
definition of "spouse" contained in the Nova Scotia Matrimonial
Property Act,'3 (which provided for a presumptively equal division of the
"matrimonial assets" of formally married spouses upon divorce)
discriminated against her contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.'4 Although successful in the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal, Ms. Walsh lost in the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court decided that, while "inequities may exist in certain
unmarried cohabiting relationships [that] may result in unfairness
between the parties on relationship breakdown, there is no
constitutional requirement that the state extend the protections of the
[Act] to those persons. 15
However, both Sharing Homes and Walsh consider the protection of
personal autonomy to be a paramount virtue, and both display a
corresponding reluctance to impose obligations on parties who have not
chosen them unequivocally. Both lean towards contract and property
law rather than relationship status as the ultimate arbiter of such
disputes. This reflects a very deep-rooted tendency in the common law
to privilege "property" over "family," an attitude so pervasive that it
may appear to be common sense.'6 The proposals in England and Wales
11. Sharing Homes, supra note 6 at ix.
12. Ibid.
13. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275, s. 11(3).
14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
15. Walsh, supra note 8 at para. 57.
16. Philip Girard, "Why Canada Has No Family Policy: Lessons from France and Italy"
(1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 579.
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for homosexual civil unions and the availability of same-sex marriage in
Canada both maintain this approach in that they impose spousal
obligations only on those who have clearly chosen them. Yet, in spite of
these tendencies, there are counter-trends at work in both countries. In
England, John Dewar argues, there has been a "familialization" of the
general law of trusts and real property, as well as the emergence of a
nascent statutory regime for the family home. In both cases, however,
he asserts that "English law has proceeded inductively, from a variety of
starting points, and has ended ... in a muddle."17 The trends identified
by Dewar can be observed in Canada too, but in both jurisdictions they
operate mostly in favour of married couples. Unmarried cohabitants
weave in and out of family law and family property legislation like will-
o'-the-wisps, and must resort to a combination of contract law, property
law and trusts principles to resolve disputes over the family home.
Those who opt for marriage or a civil union of some kind will have
their rights defined comprehensively by legislation; however, those who
do not will be left to the common law and a series of piecemeal
statutory concessions.
This article considers the manner in which Britain and Canada have
dealt with the vexed issue of property rights in the family home as
between unmarried cohabitants. We begin by looking briefly at the law
governing matrimonial property in both jurisdictions, since it is in this
area that special provisions relating to the family home are most
developed, and then contrast this with the law applicable to cohabitants'
property. We then discuss the manner in which the judiciary and
legislatures in Canada and Britain have dealt with this issue to date,
critically analyze a variety of proposals for future reform, and examine
the potential influence of constitutional equality provisions and human
rights law on property rights in the family home. We conclude that any
change is likely to come through policy initiatives and legislative
17. John Dewar, "Land, Law and the Family Home" in Susan Bright & John Dewar,
eds., Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 329.
See also John Dewar & Stephen Parker, "English Family Law Since World War II: From
Status to Chaos" in Sanford N. Katz, John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean, eds., Cross
Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and England (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
changes rather than constitutional ordering. However, we concede that
any comprehensive legal regime for the family home which meets the
expectations of couples who are living together in conjugal relationships
may be a long way off.
I. The Position in Canada
A. Spouses and the Matrimonial Home
In every Canadian province and territory since 1980, formally married
spouses have had a recognized set of rights in the matrimonial home,
regardless of the actual state of the title. They have occupation rights
during marriage similar to those that exist in Britain under the Family
Law Act 1996,"8 and a prima facie claim to an equal share of the capital
value is available on dissolution of the marriage.' 9 This is in stark
contrast to the previous situation under separate property, where title
ruled and the courts were reduced to creating novel equitable interests
out of thin air in order to remedy situations of injustice.2" These rights
are not identical across all provinces, but-with the exception of
Newfoundland and Labrador-the differences are not significant.21
18. Family Law Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 27.
19. Opting out of either or both sets of rights is, generally speaking, allowed.
"Dissolution of the marriage" is used throughout as a shorthand for death, divorce or
separation where the resumption of cohabitation is unlikely. Any one of these triggers
the right to apply for a division of statutorily defined "matrimonial assets" or "family
property."
20. Bora Laskin, "The Deserted Wife's Equity in the Matrimonial Home: A Dissent"
(1961) 14 U.T.L.J. 67.
21. For a convenient overview, see James G. McLeod & Alfred A. Mamo, Matrimonial
Property Law in Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1993). While largely a
civil law jurisdiction in its private law, the articles of the Quebec Civil Code on these
matters provide results very similar to those in the common law provinces. Although
married parties have a choice of matrimonial regime, between the (default) deferred
community regime called partnership of acquests and separate property, non-titled
spouses are given occupation rights in the matrimonial home and veto rights on its
disposition during marriage pursuant to imperative provisions which cannot be derogated
from by contract; Arts. 401-413 C.C.Q. In Newfoundland the Family Law Act creates a
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Three sets of rights in the matrimonial home exist during marriage in
addition to occupation rights. First, each spouse has a right of possession
equal to any interest of the other spouse in a matrimonial home. In
practical terms, a titled spouse can no longer evict a non-titled spouse.22
The latter has been granted a legislative "toe-hold" in the matrimonial
home, in that only a court order or separation agreement could vary or
terminate the right to possession. Such rights are clearly based not just
on the need for shelter, which might be supplied in some other place,
but on the desirability of providing continuity in a specific abode.
Second, the consent of each spouse is required with regard to any
disposition or encumbrance of the matrimonial home, whether or not
he or she holds a title interest in it. This does not involve a major
change since it only mimics in a clearer and more principled way the
protection afforded a wife by her dower right and earlier, the protection
afforded a husband by his right to curtesy.23 The policy basis of such
rights is clearly to encourage consultation between spouses before any
major change is made to their living arrangements. These rights also
recognize the uniquely personal nature of the matrimonial home; no
other asset of the spouses is treated in this fashion. The law here
recognizes a use-based personhood interest in a particular asset, even
though the person possessing that interest may have no formal title to
the asset at all. Finally, both spouses have rights to notification by
encumbrancers of the home seeking to realize upon a security interest,
statutory joint tenancy in the matrimonial home between spouses regardless of the initial
state of title; R.S.N. 1990, c. F-2, s. 8.
22. This is not quite true in the Western provinces, where spouses are not formally
endowed with an equal right to possession of the matrimonial home, but a spouse can
apply for a court order for exclusive possession of, or eviction of a spouse from, the
matrimonial home regardless of title.
23. Unlike the situation in England and Wales, dower remained a live issue in
conveyancing in the common law provinces until its abolition in the matrimonial
property reform legislation. The prohibitions on dispositions of the matrimonial home
are, in the Western provinces, largely left in their homesteads legislation which replaced
common law dower early in the 20th century. Such legislation also provides a life estate
in the matrimonial home to a surviving spouse over and above the claims of any creditors
of the deceased spouse's estate.
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
and the same rights to redemption or relief from forfeiture, regardless of
the state of the title.
For a complete view of the legal regime of the matrimonial home, one
must also look at both post-divorce and post-mortem situations.
Treatment of the matrimonial home after divorce reveals that persons
other than the spouses may be considered to have a personhood interest
in it, for example, the children of the marriage. In Quebec, articles 409
and 410 of the Civil Code24 authorize a court to grant a right of
occupation in the former matrimonial home to the parent having
custody of any child of the marriage, and Nova Scotia case law shows a
clear pattern of allowing a postponement of the equal division of the
home on divorce if the custodial parent wishes to remain there and it is
financially feasible." Nova Scotia courts have adopted this rule almost
instinctively, without a great deal of reflection, and it is a clear
exception to what is otherwise a strictly enforced principle of equal
division of matrimonial assets. The same tendency has been noted in
some other provinces. 6
It is in the post-mortem context that there is the most variation
between provinces with regard to the treatment of the matrimonial
home. Surviving spouses may gain, over and above entitlements arising
from a division of property or by will: (1) specific property rights in the
matrimonial home, as in the Western provinces and Nova Scotia; (2)
rights of occupation, as in Quebec;2 or (3) minimal or no additional
rights, as in the rest of Canada. The four Western provinces all provide
for a statutory life estate in the "homestead" (essentially the matrimonial
home) for the surviving spouse in addition to any matrimonial
property, testate and intestate succession entitlements. The survivor's
life estate also prevails over any inconsistent disposition of a homestead
24. Arts. 409, 410 C.C.Q.
25. Robski v. Robski (1997), 166 N.S.R. (2d) 161 (S.C.) is just one of many examples.
26. Matrimonial Home, supra note 2, suggests the same is true in that province. For
Saskatchewan, see McLeod & Mamo, supra note 21 at S-43-54, though the authors note a
trend away from this in the case of very young children where the interest of the non-
custodial spouse would be postponed for a long time.
27. Arts. 409, 410 of the Civil Code of Quebec also authorize a court to grant
occupation rights to a surviving parent in case of a spouse's death.
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in a will. In Nova Scotia, the Intestate Succession Act28 allows a surviving
spouse to elect to take the matrimonial home instead of his or her
preferential share of $50,000 in the estate of the deceased spouse, even
though the equity in the home is frequently worth much more.29 The
policy basis of this provision is ambiguous. On one view, it looks like a
clear commitment to the personhood interest in the matrimonial home.
On another, it may be more concerned with securing the basic right of
shelter to a surviving spouse where there are few assets and little
economic security. Even if the latter is the primary rationale, however,
it does not exclude the former. Nova Scotia's Matrimonial Property Act
also allows a child to apply for possession of the matrimonial home
until age 24, where the surviving spouse did not live in the home but the
child did (presumably with the now deceased spouse).30
In other provinces, the post-mortem situation is much less favourable
to the surviving spouse. In Ontario, the Family Law Act"t accords a right
of occupation of sixty days to a surviving spouse who has no title
interest in the matrimonial home. 2 The remaining provinces have no
specific provision for any continuing rights of a surviving spouse in the
matrimonial home. While an application by a surviving spouse for a
division of assets (Canadian matrimonial property legislation generally
applies on death), coupled with testate or intestate succession benefits,
will normally provide at least a half-share in the capital of the
matrimonial home, any co-tenants will be able to exercise their rights to
partition. This may well force the surviving spouse to leave the home if
he or she cannot afford to buy out the others.
The general policy of Canadian law is to recognize the special position
of the matrimonial home in the lives of married couples and their
families. The state of the title is basically irrelevant during marriage, and
it is the only asset over which spouses do not have free power of
disposition. Consultation between spouses with regard to major
28. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 236.
29. The provision has been copied in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.
30. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275, s. 11(3).
31. R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3.
32. Ibid., s. 26(2). This represents a 50% increase on the original period of quarantine
allowed to a widow at common law.
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
decisions about the home is mandatory and non-titled spouses have a
number of important rights vis-a-vis encumbrancers. The interests of
children in stability and continuity of residence are recognized in the
jurisprudence on post-divorce occupation by custodial parents, and in
some cases by legislation. The regime for the matrimonial home in
Canada is more than "nascent," as Dewar suggests it is in England;" it is
comprehensive, except for the somewhat ragged provisions for
continued occupation by a non-title holding surviving spouse.
B. Cohabitants and the Family Home
The position of common law spouses is governed by the doctrine of
separate property, under which beneficial ownership follows the legal
title, tempered somewhat by the law of trusts, contract and unjust
enrichment. Two Supreme Court of Canada cases, Pettkus v. Becker34
and Peter v. Beblow,35 are considered landmarks in clarifying the law
governing the property of individuals in common-law relationships, but
the voluminous case law purporting to apply them reveals few easily
discernible patterns. Cossman and Melamed report that "the doctrine of
unjust enrichment imposes onerous requirements on claimants, at the
same time as it vests very broad discretion with the courts."36 In effect,
Canada has a regime of judicial discretion in property allocation on
termination of a common-law relationship. Ironically, this regime
would not have a hope of passing in any legislature in the country if it
were presented as a bill.
With regard to the family home, there is very patchy protection for a
common law spouse who is not a co-tenant. Temporary orders for
exclusive possession of the home can be given on an emergency basis in
cases of domestic violence in at least five provinces and the Yukon,
3R
33. See Introduction, above.
34. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
35. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 621.
36 Brenda Cossman & Daniel Melamed, 'Unjust Enrichment after Peter v. Beblow"
(2000) 15 Money & Family Law 65.
37. Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27; The Domestic Violence
and Stalking Prevention, Protection and Compensation and Consequential Amendments Act,
S.M. 1998, c. 41; Domestic Violence Intervention Act, S.N.S. 2001, c. 29; Victims of Family
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while in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, orders for
possession can be given to a cohabitant without title who has made a.
support application. 8 No province requires the title holder of a family
home to seek the consent of his or her common-law spouse before
alienating or encumbering it. In British Columbia, for example, the
definition of spouse was changed in a number of provincial statutes, but
it was not changed in the Land (Spouse Protection) Act, 9 the statute
mandating consent to dispositions of the matrimonial home by a
formally married spouse without title. Curiously, in some provinces,
the position of a common-law partner improves dramatically upon the
death of his or her partner. For example, under the British Columbia
Estate Administration Act,4° the surviving common-law partner of an
intestate automatically receives a life estate in the family home, in
addition to other benefits to which he or she may be entitled."
It cannot be said that there is a regime for the family home with
respect to common-law families in Canada, but Canadian family lawyers
expected that this might change with the Supreme Court's decision in
Walsh."2 Susan Walsh and Wayne Bona had lived together for about ten
years and had two children together when they decided to separate in
1995. The parties were joint tenants of the family home, but after
separation Bona retained some assets in his name to which Walsh felt
she was entitled. However, she did not meet the definition of "spouse"
under the Act. She could have started an action based on the private law
Violence Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c. V-3.2; The Victims of Domestic Violence Act, S.S. 1994, c.
V-6.02; Family Violence Prevention Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 84, ss. 4, 10.
38. Maintenance and Custody Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160, s. 7, as am. by S.N.S. 2000, c. 29;
Family LawAct, R.S.N. 1990, c. F-2, s. 40(1)(d) as am. by S.N.S. 2000, c. 29.
39. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 246.
40. Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, s. 96.
41. The definition of common-law spouse in this Act requires two years of cohabitation
in a marriage-like relationship (including a same-sex relationship) immediately before the
death of the intestate.
42. Walsh, supra note 8. See e.g. Onofrio Ferlisi, "Recognizing a Fundamental Change: A
Comment on Walsh, the Charter, and the Definition of Spouse", Case Comment (2001)
18 Can. J. Fam. L. 159 (comment on Court of Appeal decision); D.A. Rollie Thompson,
"Annotation to Walsh v. Bona" (2003), 32 R.F.L. 87 at 91 (observing that the Supreme
Court's previous jurisprudence seemed to "pre-ordain the result in Walsh v. Bona, as
similar family functions overcame any differences of status").
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remedies outlined above, but was advised to challenge the relevant
provisions of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act. If successful,
she would have been able to claim the benefit of a prima facie equal
division of the parties' "matrimonial" assets, rather than bearing the
onus of proof in an action based on unjust enrichment. Based on a series
of Supreme Court decisions restricting governmental power to deny
benefits on the basis of marital status, many court watchers predicted
success for Walsh. She did succeed at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,
though the government was given time to amend its legislation in order
to address the constitutional violation.43 However, her arguments failed
at the Supreme Court of Canada, where eight judges agreed that the Act,
which made certain rights available to those who had chosen marriage
but withheld them from those who had not, was not discriminatory.
Functional similarities between married and cohabiting couples were
not, by themselves, sufficient to guarantee equal treatment because there
was considerable heterogeneity among cohabitants. Walsh's right to
dignity, considered the touchstone of equality analysis since the
Supreme Court's decision in Law v. Canada," was thus not
compromised, especially where some remedies existed to address her
situation. Furthermore, the right to choose whether or not to marry
was upheld, not infringed, by the treatment of marriage in the Act. This
right is part of the basic value of liberty enshrined in the Canadian
Charter, which guarantees the right to make fundamental choices in life.
The definition of spouse in the Act protected autonomy by restricting
the rights and obligations of marriage to those who unequivocally
choose to marry.
We agree with other commentators 4 that the Supreme Court did not
convincingly distinguish its own decisions in M. v. H.46 or in Miron v.
Trudel.4 In the latter case, a provision of the Ontario Insurance Act48
43. Walsh v. Bona (2000), 183 N.S.R. (2d) 74 (C.A.), rev'g (1999), 178 N.S.R. (2d) 151
(S.C.).
44. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
45. Thompson, supra note 42; Bala, "Controversy", supra note 5 at 48-55.
46. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
47. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 456.
48. R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8.
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restricting benefits of an insurance policy to formally married parties
was found to discriminate on the basis of marital status, and the Court
"read in" an expanded definition including common-law partners who
had cohabited for at least three years. It is true that Miron dealt with the
rights of a couple with regard to third parties, as opposed to the rights of
the members of the couple between themselves, but the majority did not
limit its analysis to this type of situation. Conversely, reading the
emphasis on "autonomy" in Walsh back into Miron leads to the
conclusion that it should not be considered wrong for a legislature to
decline to provide the insurance benefits in question; the legislature
could claim to be merely respecting the decision of the parties
themselves not to marry.
While Justice Bastarache, for the majority in Walsh, at least tried to
distinguish Miron, he did not even mention M. v. H. In M. v. H., the
Supreme Court held that it was discriminatory to exclude same-sex
couples from the right to apply for support after termination of their
relationship, a right available to opposite-sex couples who had cohabited
for three years or had a child. Although the Supreme Court in M. v. H.
extended the right to apply for support to same-sex cohabitants, it
refused in Walsh to grant a right of division of the family home to
opposite-sex cohabitants. Why does exclusion from the right to apply
for support compromise human dignity but not exclusion from the
right to apply for a division of property?
Justice Gonthier tried to answer this question in his concurring
opinion in Walsh by making a distinction between a division of
matrimonial property as a matter of contract-either entered into
directly by the parties or "indirectly by the fact of marriage""9-and
support obligations, which seek to fill "a social objective,"5 that is,
alleviating the burden on the public purse by imposing support
obligations on family members. With respect, whatever analytical value
this distinction may have in civil law jurisdictions (and it may possess
considerable power there, given the traditional choice of matrimonial
regimes open to parties marrying in Quebec), it is not convincing in
common law Canada. Matrimonial property legislation, at least in the
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
49. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 at 427.
50. Ibid.
common law provinces, was undoubtedly enacted to fulfill a social
objective: "to recognize ... that there is a joint contribution to marriage
made by each spouse that entitles each spouse equally to the
matrimonial assets.""1 This deemed joint contribution was undeniably a
significant change in Canadian public policy regarding marriage and the
family. Public policy had previously relied on differentiated gender roles
as the basis for legal entitlements (or lack of them) on marriage
breakdown. Equally surprising is a complete absence in Walsh of any
concern about the feminization of poverty, one of the leitmotifs of the
Supreme Court's divorce jurisprudence over the last dozen years.5 2
Arguably, the decision illustrates the profound commitment of the
common law to maintain "property" as a zone of autonomy and privacy
that cannot be entered without consent.5 3
C. The Policy Question
Why do we treat common-law families differently from marriage-
based families? The Supreme Court of Canada, in Walsh, has told us that
it is legitimate to treat them differently because the value of autonomy
in personal relationships trumps claims for equal treatment. Certainly
autonomy is highly valued in Canada and in most Western countries.
However, the Supreme Court overlooked the practical effects of
considering only the couple itself in its conception of autonomy. For
example, it did not look at the effect of this view on children of the
relationship. The children of married couples will have their need for
stability and continuity taken into account when decisions are made
about allocation of the matrimonial home after divorce. The children of
common-law couples, however, are treated with no such solicitude. The
title holder can evict his or her family with impunity on termination of
the relationship, 4 and even a successful claim based on unjust
enrichment is unlikely to lead to the non-title holder regaining
51. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275.
52. Mogev. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, 99 D.L.R. (4th) 456.
53. Girard, supra note 16.
54. See Alva Orlando, "Exclusive Possession of the Family Home: The Plight of
Battered Cohabitees" (1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 153.
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possession. It is difficult to understand why the law should countenance
such divergent treatment of these two groups of families."5 Even where
cohabiting couples keep their economic lives separate, the one area in
which they must co-operate is with regard to their shared home. This
non-negotiable reality is sufficient to justify intervention by the law to
deal with occupation rights or title on termination of the relationship.
Where assets other than the family home are concerned, the Supreme
Court's protection of autonomy is arguably more defensible. Where one
party to a common-law relationship enters with substantial assets, and
the other with none, there seems to be no moral or policy justification
for a large transfer of wealth at the end of a relatively brief period of
cohabitation. Although laypersons may widely assume that equal
division of assets follows the termination of a common-law relationship,
this expectation may not be a legitimate basis for justifying an equal
division of wealth. Any argument based on functional similarity
between common-law couples and married couples gains force only as
the period of cohabitation lengthens. However, at some necessarily
arbitrary point, one can infer that the "trial" period of a relationship has
passed, such that it is reasonable to consider a commitment to exist. We
believe that Manitoba's three-year threshold is appropriate for this
purpose. Social science evidence indicates that less than half of
cohabitating relationships reach this point. Thus, we believe that three
years of cohabitation represents a reasonable threshold for deeming the
trial period to be over. 6 Many provincial laws dealing with support also
deem a relationship with legal consequences to exist between unmarried
parents when a child is born into the relationship. The child is
effectively treated as a proxy for the commitment involved in a formal
marriage. Even though this equivalency can be challenged as
unwarranted in some cases-for example, where a pregnancy was
unplanned-legislation must address the generality of human experience.
55. For a similar critique of Quebec law, which is also the only Canadian jurisdiction
without a legislated support obligation between cohabitants, see Goubau, Otis &
Robitaille, supra note 4.
56. Zheng Wu, Cohabitation: An Alternative Form of Family Living (Don Mills, ON:
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 1.
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We believe that the "child equals deemed relationship" presumption is
usually a valid one.
A high threshold for ascribing legal status to cohabitation relationships
would seem sufficient to protect the autonomy of individuals. However,
even if there is agreement about the appropriate threshold, there is no
constitutional requirement that the legal rights and responsibilities of
those who reach it must be identical to those of married couples. The
next section analyzes the various choices made by provincial
governments with respect to the regulation of cohabitants' economic
lives, with particular reference to their treatment of the family home.
D. Recent Legislation and Proposalsfor Future Reform
There are several ways in which legislation might address issues
relating to the shared home of common-law spouses. One way is simply
to extend the benefits and obligations of matrimonial property laws to
them after a certain threshold of cohabitation is reached. Another is to
create a new form of civil status and allow couples opting into it to be
treated as spouses under relevant legislation, while those not opting to
do so remain subject to the common law. Yet another possibility is to
create a new form of spousal status but also provide a safety net for
those who do not register for it. All of these approaches have recently
been tried in Canada.
Saskatchewan extended its matrimonial property legislation to
unmarried couples as a result of an unappealed lower court decision that
declared unconstitutional the restricted definition of spouse. 7 However,
when the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion
and gave that province a year to change the law, a different approach
was taken.5" The Nova Scotia government implemented the registered
domestic partnership, a new form of civil status open to both opposite-
sex and same-sex couples living in a conjugal relationship. On
registration of a declaration of domestic partnership, the parties opt into
more than a dozen provincial statutes that confer benefits and impose
57. Watch v. Watch (1999), 182 Sask. R. 237 (Q.B.). Since Nova Scotia v. Walsh, it is clear
that Watch was wrong and the province need not have acted as it did.
58. Walsh v. Bona, supra note 43.
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obligations on formally married spouses.5 9 Nova Scotia has secreted a
new type of civil status in the interstices of the Vital Statistics Act:60 the
domestic partnership, which comes complete with its own set of
formalities, "divorce" provisions, and civil effects. 61 As might be
expected, this new status has been used much more by same-sex couples
than opposite-sex couples. According to the Nova Scotia Registrar of
Vital Statistics, same-sex couples accounted for 70-80 percent of the 180
domestic partnerships registered between June 1, 2001 and March 1,
2003.62 It may be that same-sex couples see it as a much desired official
validation of their relationship; opposite-sex couples, on the other hand,
are free to marry if they want that kind of validation. The new
partnership would be attractive to only the small subset of opposite-sex
couples who oppose the formal institution of marriage on ideological
grounds but wish to engage its civil effects.
Two Western provinces have recently tried to mix and match these
two approaches. Manitoba's Common Law Partners' Property and
Related Amendments Act63 (CLPPA) adopts the Nova Scotia type of
registered domestic partnership, defined as a "relationship between two
adults who, not being married to each other, are cohabiting with each
other in a conjugal relationship."64 The Act then proceeds to amend a
dozen or so statutes to place parties to such relationships on the same
footing as formally married spouses. Among other matters covered by
the amendments, provisions on the family home are included in the
Marital Property Act6" (now renamed the Family Property Act), the Family
59. Law Reform (2000)Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 29.
60. R.S.N.S. 1989, C. 494.
61. Quebec too created a new title on "civil unions" in 2002. Art. 121, C.C.Q..
62. Exact figures are not available because the Act does not require the parties to state
their gender on the application form. The Registrar kindly provided an estimate by
scanning the first names of the parties.
63. S.M. 2002, c. 48 s. 23 [CLPPA]. The CLPPA amends the Manitoba Vital Statistics Act
by adding this definition to s. 1 and a number of provisions relating to registration and
termination of such relationships. The Act was passed in August 2002 but not proclaimed
in force until 30 June 2004; parts of s. 25 dealing with consequential amendments to the
Wills Act remain unproclaimed.
64. Ibid., section 10(1)(b.2).
65. C.C.S.M., c. F25.
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Maintenance Act,66 and the Homesteads Act.67 However, the CLPPA also
recognizes a new form of unregistered domestic partnership and provides
for it the same legal consequences with respect to the family home as for
the registered domestic partnership in the statutes it amends. The parties
to an unregistered domestic partnership must have cohabited in a
conjugal relationship for at least three years, or for one year if they are
"together the parents of a child."68 Presumably, the "togetherness"
requirement excludes same-sex couples where one partner has a child,
but this will no doubt be the subject of judicial interpretation.
The CLPPA provides for occupation orders, previously unavailable in
Canada, between common-law spouses during their relationship and
after its termination. It states that:
one of the spouses or common-law partners has the right to continue occupying the
family residence for such length of time as the court may order, notwithstanding that the
other spouse or common-law partner alone is the owner or lessee of the residence or that
both spouses or common-law partners together are the owners or lessees of the
residence.69
It also clarifies that where an order is made, the court may include in
the order a provision that such rights as the other spouse or
common-law partner may have as owner or lessee to apply for partition
and sale, to sell, or to otherwise dispose of the residence shall be
postponed subject to the right of occupancy contained in the order70
The Manitoba example represents a thoughtful attempt to come to
grips with some of the problems created by the proliferation of
common-law families. It is unusual in that it was not spurred by court
challenges to Manitoba laws, but was a proactive move by government.
Although Manitoba has chosen to make the rights and obligations of
common-law couples, whether registered or unregistered, essentially
uniform with those of married persons, this is not the only model
66. C.C.S.M., c. F20.
67. C.C.S.M., c. H80.
68. CLPPA, supra note 63, s. 1(b)(ii).
69. S.M. 2002, c. 48 s. 6(4).
70. Ibid., s. 10(5).
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available. Other provinces may wish to experiment with less intrusive
measures, such as those dealing with the family home only.
The Alberta Adult Interdependent Relationships Act" is certainly less
intrusive. It amends a variety of provincial legislation to give spousal-
type rights to "adult interdependent partners," but mainly in non-
property related contexts such as consent to medical treatment and
support obligations. For example, the Matrimonial Property Act is not
amended to include adult interdependent partners, nor is the Dower
Act. 2 The only property-related act to be amended is the Intestate
Succession Act,73 where the rights of the adult interdependent partner are
equated with those of a surviving spouse. Outside this rather narrow
context, an adult interdependent partner with no title acquires no rights
in the home in which the partners cohabit. The AIRA applies on an
ascriptive basis where two adults have been living in a "relationship of
interdependence" other than a marriage for at least three years, or in a
relationship of "some permanence" where a child has been born. 4
Conjugality is not a requirement, but the parties are required to "share
each other's lives, [be] emotionally committed to one another, and
function as an economic and domestic unit."71 In addition, there is a
long list of factors to be considered by a court in deciding whether a
particular relationship falls within the Act. 76 It is widely acknowledged
that the Act was passed in response to growing pressure to recognize the
rights of gay and lesbian couples, but drafted so as to disguise this
motivation.1
7
71. S.A. 2002, c. 1; consolidated as R.S.A., c. A-4.5 [AIRA].
72. R.S.A. 2000, c. D-15.
73. R.S.A. 2000, c. 1-10.
74. AIRA, supra note 71, s. 3(1)(a).
75. Ibid., s.l(1)(f).
76. It should be noted that if the parties are related by blood or adoption, the Act will
apply to them only if they contract into it.
77. See the discussion in Bala, "Controversy", supra note 5 at 89-96. Alberta is the only
province which has announced it will try to invoke s. 33 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms to avoid any federal legislation on same-sex marriage, but it is not
clear whether this avenue is legally permissible.
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E. Functional Equality Versus Autonomy: Potential Problems
Canadian law is in a state of flux at the moment, as legislators
experiment with a variety of approaches to deal with new family
groupings. With the recent legal recognition of same-sex marriage, the
device of the registered domestic partnership may soon be superceded.
Since full legal marriage is now open to them, it is not clear why gay
and lesbian couples seeking a marital-type commitment would choose a
registered domestic partnership, and the device seems to be of limited
appeal to heterosexual couples. This suggests that the main policy issue
in the future, given the favourable treatment by the Supreme Court of
the support obligations of same-sex couples, will relate to property
issues between unmarried couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex.
Disputes over the shared home will feature prominently. Even though
the Supreme Court in Walsh said that governments are not
constitutionally obliged to treat married and unmarried couples equally
in terms of family home protections and property division mechanisms,
this does not mean they are precluded from doing so, or that some
halfway measures between full marital-type treatment and the common
law might not be advisable.
Academic and law reform opinion in Canada is divided on the subject
of ascribing equivalency to married and common-law couples. 8 The
Ontario Law Reform Commission, before its demise, recommended
that the definition of spouse in the Family Law Act be amended to
include heterosexual couples cohabiting for three years or in a
relationship of some permanence if they are the parents of a child; it did
not recommend ascriptive inclusion for same-sex couples, but rather the
78. Feminist commentators are to be found on both sides of the debate. See the
contributions to the "Symposium: Domestic Partnerships" in (2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L.,
especially Carol Smart, "Stories of Family Life: Cohabitation, Marriage and Social
Change" (2000) 17 Can. J. Fain. L. 20; Winifred Holland, "Intimate Relationships in the
New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?" (2000) 17 Can. J.
Fam. L. 114; Nicholas Bala, "Alternatives for Extending Spousal Status in Canada" (2000)
17 Can. J. Fam. L. 169. See also Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "What is Marriage-like
Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality" (2001) 18 Can. J. Fam. L. 269.
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creation of a registered domestic partnership scheme.7 ' The Nova Scotia
Law Reform Commission recommended in 1997 that the Matrimonial
Property Act be extended to same-sex and opposite-sex cohabitants on an
ascriptive basis where parties have cohabited for at least a year in "a
personal relationship in which one provides personal or financial
commitment and support of a domestic nature for the benefit of the
other.""0 The Law Commission of Canada seeks to have it both ways,
observing that "the value of autonomy requires that governments put in
place the conditions in which people can freely choose their close
personal relationships," but that "autonomy is compromised if the state
provides one relationship status with more benefits and legal support
than others."8" However, if one's choice is only between various types
of "relationship status," all of which have the same attributes, how is
autonomy advanced? The Manitoba and Saskatchewan reforms may be
criticized on that ground, while the law in Alberta may be faulted for
ignoring one of the major sources of conflict between parties to "adult
interdependent relationships": the allocation of property rights. The
fuzzy definition of interdependent relationships beyond those that are
clearly conjugal is also likely to cause considerable confusion.
It is not surprising that legislators are puzzled. The competing claims
of equality and autonomy are not easily reconciled. The decision to live
together without marrying conveys a negative message-we are not
married-but it is less clear what the positive message is. Empirical
studies in Canada reveal that relationships based on cohabitation are
shorter and produce fewer children than marriages. Less than half of all
cohabiting unions will last for three years, whereas 90 percent of all first
marriages last for at least ten years.8 2 Some sociologists argue that
cohabitation is not just a prelude to marriage, but has become an
alternative living arrangement in its own right. For example, some U.S.
79. Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of Cohabitants under the Family Law Act
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993).
80. Final Report: Reform of the Law Dealing with Matrimonial Property in Nova Scotia
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission, 1997).
81. Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and supporting close
personal adult relationships (Canada: Ottawa, 2002) at 18.
82. Wu, supra note 56 at 108.
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scholars suggest that cohabitation be viewed as more functionally
similar to being single than it is to being married, based on similar
patterns of behaviour between cohabitants and single persons.8" This
suggests that fully equating the rights of married and cohabiting couples
may not be advisable, but that a more modest set of rights in the family
home, a sort of "lite" regime relating principally to possession rather
than title (similar to the Manitoba provision), might be appropriate.
Such a proposal would still leave largely intact the value of autonomy in
domestic relations while providing a safety net to address the need for
stability and continuity in family life, especially where children are
concerned. A requirement for consent to disposition by the non-titled
common-law spouse would not necessarily have to be part of the
package, but the rights to notification and redemption against
foreclosing encumbrancers should be. Such rights would not affect
autonomy but might enhance stability.
With regard to the post-mortem situation, some Canadian provinces
have arguably moved too quickly to equate marriage and cohabitation
in the area of intestate succession. Canadian intestate succession
provisions typically allow a surviving spouse a preferential share in the
estate of the deceased where it is worth less than a certain amount
(ranging between $40,000 and $75,000). Children are entirely excluded
from succession in such cases. This is justifiable in the case of married
persons because the survivor will have a support obligation towards any
dependent children, and it avoids multiple titles to the matrimonial
home. However, equating a surviving cohabitant or "adult
interdependent partner" with a spouse in this context means their rights
will trump those of any children of the deceased, even though the
cohabitant may not be the parent of those children or have any support
obligation towards them. If the purpose of intestate succession law is to
be a statutory will, one may wonder whether the new provisions in
Alberta and British Columbia truly reflect the desires of most
cohabitants. Those who bring children into a relationship of
cohabitation may prefer them to share in their assets rather than have all
83. Ronald R. Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, "Cohabitation: A Precursor to
Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?" (1990) 16 Population and Development Rev.
703.
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of those assets devolve to the surviving common-law spouse. Once
again, it may be appropriate that some share of the deceased cohabitant's
estate pass to the survivor, but not necessarily the same share as that of a
deceased spouse.
While provincial legislators have tested a range of legal responses to
the issues raised by unmarried cohabitation and ownership of the family
home, each creates its own problems. Such observations are not unique
to Canada. In Britain, attempts to improve the existing law governing
the property relations of cohabitants have created a similar legal
dilemma.
II. The Legal Framework in Britain
A. Spouses and the Matrimonial Home
In Britain, as in Canada, the starting point is the doctrine of separate
property.84 During marriage, beneficial ownership of the matrimonial
home is determined by the names on the title documents or by ordinary
rules of property law-the law of trusts in particular-where title is not
in joint names.8 This is often an issue where one spouse is trying to
resist sale of the home at the behest of a third party, such as a lender or
trustee in bankruptcy with a claim against the other spouse's interest in
the property. 6 Unlike in Canada, there is no statutory requirement for
one spouse to secure the other's consent in relation to any disposition or
encumbrance of the home. The fact that major decisions about the
property can be made without consultation between couples is a
significant gap in English law.
84. As established by the Married Women's Property Act 1882 (U.K.), 45 & 46 Vict., c.
75. For criticisms of this doctrine, see Otto Kahn-Freund, "Inconsistencies and Injustices
in the Law of Husband and Wife" (1952) 15 Mod. L. Rev. 133.
85. A non-owning spouse will have to rely on the rules of resulting and constructive
trusts. The relevant criteria are the same as those for cohabiting couples and are discussed
below. Another option is the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, which is also discussed
below.
86. For illustrations of a non-owning spouse trying to assert a beneficial interest in the
home in these circumstances, see Lloyds Bank plc v. Rosset, [1991] 1 A.C. 107 (H.L.)
[Lloyds Bank]; Le Foe v. Le Foe [2001] 2 Fam L.R. 970 (Fam. Div.) [Le Foe].
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However, there are a number of statutes relating principally to
enjoyment of the home that do recognize the emotional and financial
significance of the property for those who reside there. The Trusts of
Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996"z allows courts to resolve
disputes involving co-owned property, such as disagreements between
spouses over whether to sell the matrimonial home or, more frequently,
applications for sale of the home by third parties. In settling such
disputes, the court must take account of specific factors, including the
purposes for which the property is held, the welfare of any minor who
occupies the property and the interests of secured creditors.8" The
extreme financial and emotional repercussions of bankruptcy engender
an additional layer of statutory protection for the matrimonial home
and those who live there where a trustee.in bankruptcy seeks sale of the
property under the TLA TA. Under the Insolvency Act 1986,89 the court
must consider the needs and financial resources of the bankrupt's spouse
and any children in deciding whether to order sale.90 Despite statutory
recognition of their personhood interest in the home, the judicial bias is
still very much towards sale of the property on bankruptcy in order to
satisfy the creditors. According to Nourse L.J. in Re Citro,9' the fact that
a wife and young children may be forced to move to another home and
school is merely the "melancholy [consequence] of debt and
improvidence with which every civilised society has been familiar."
Meanwhile, the Family Law Act 199692 provides a legal framework for
regulating occupation of the home between the couple themselves.
During marriage, a non-owning spouse enjoys "matrimonial home
rights" under the FLA, and cannot be evicted or excluded from the
87. Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 47, s. 14
[TLA TA ].
88. Ibid.
89. Insolvency Act 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45.
90. Ibid., s. 336(4). However, this protection is weakened by a statutory presumption
that, once a year has passed since the initial bankruptcy order, the interests of the
creditors are deemed to outweigh the bankrupt's family in the absence of "special
circumstances"; s. 336(5).
91. (19911 Ch. 142 at 157 (C.A).
92. Family Law Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 27 [FLA].
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property by the other spouse without a court order.93 These rights can
also be registered by the non-owning spouse to provide statutory notice
to a third party of the spouse's occupation, 94 though (as in Canada) this
is not common practice. The FLA also contains extensive provisions for
dealing with allegations of domestic violence between spouses; section
33, for example, allows the court to make an occupation order
regulating occupation of the home. 95 The court must consider the
couple's housing needs, their conduct and, most important, the effect of
its decision on the health, safety and well-being of the parties and any
relevant children.96 An occupation order is mandatory where the
applicant or a relevant child would otherwise suffer significant harm.97
On relationship breakdown, beneficial ownership of the matrimonial
home is irrelevant and the emphasis shifts from property law to family
law; judges will reallocate a couple's assets if it is just and reasonable to
do so.98 There is no deemed community of property on relationship
breakdown as there is in most Canadian provinces under the respective
matrimonial property laws. Instead, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973"9
contemplates a range of financial provision orders and property
adjustment orders upon judicial separation and divorce, taking account
of the couple's resources, their financial needs and any contributions
(both financial and non-financial) towards the welfare of the family.1°°
Overall primary consideration must be given to the welfare of any
minor children," 1 which takes account of the need for stability and
93. Ibid., s. 30.
94. Ibid., ss. 31-32.
95. Ibid., s. 33(3). For example, the applicant may be permitted to enter the property, or
the respondent instructed to leave the home where the couple is still living together.
96. Ibid., s. 33(6).
97. Ibid., s. 33(7). Former spouses may also seek occupation orders under s. 35.
98. For an overview of the legal consequences of marriage in this particular context and
the evolution of property rights between spouses, see Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), c. 3; Lisa Glennon,
"Matrimonial Property: Legal Developments and Social Trends" in W. John Morgan &
Stephen Livingstone, eds., Law and Public Opinion in Twentieth-Century Britain and
Ireland (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2003), c. 3.
99. Matrimonial CausesAct 1973 (U.K.), 1973, c. 18, s. 23-24. [Matrimonial CausesAct].
100. Ibid., s. 25.
101. Ibid.
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continuity in their upbringing. Such factors might persuade the court to
instruct the non-custodial spouse to transfer the matrimonial home to
the custodial spouse, irrespective of the state of title. That aside, the
judicial trend is increasingly towards equal division of spousal assets on
divorce, especially at the end of a long marriage, with the emphasis on
achieving a fair outcome and equal weight being placed on
"breadwinning" and "homemaking" contributions to the family during
marriage. 10 2 In other words, English law is now similar to that in the
common-law Canadian provinces; despite fundamentally different
approaches, the practical outcome is broadly the same for spouses on the
dissolution of a marriage.
Turning to the postmortem context, English law makes no special
provision for the matrimonial home beyond any general testate and
intestate succession, and does not compare favourably with Canada. In
Britain, a surviving spouse does have first claim on the deceased's estate
as next-of-kin under the Administration of Estates Act 1925,1"3 which
applies a statutory model for the distribution of assets where the
deceased died intestate." 4 Where title to the family home is not in joint
names, the surviving spouse can appropriate the property as part of his
102. See e.g. White v. White, [2000] 2 Fam. L.R. 981 (H.L.); Lambert v. Lambert, [2002]
EWCA 1685 (C.A.). However, in a landmark case, the wife of Premiership footballer,
Ray Parlour, was recently awarded a share of her husband's future earnings as part of a
divorce settlement. The Court of Appeal described the case as "far removed from the
norm," but was influenced by the huge surplus income once the reasonable needs of the
couple and their children had been met, as well as Karen Parlour's part in persuading her
husband to give up drinking and to concentrate on his high-earning football career early
in the marriage. Legal observers have suggested that the implications of the ruling for the
rich and famous will lead to a huge increase in the number of pre-nuptial agreements in
Britain; see "Footballer's Ex-Wife Nets Share of His Future Income" The Times (8 July
2004).
103. (U.K.), 15 & 16 Geo. V, s. 41 [AEA]; Intestates Act 1952 (U.K.), 15 & 16 Geo. VI, c.
64, Sch. 2, para. 1(1). The current financial limits for this statutory legacy are the first
£200,000 plus half of the residue where there are no children or the first £125,000 plus
one-third of the residue where the deceased dies leaving issue. Where title to the home is
in joint names, the deceased's interest in the property passes to the surviving spouse by
virtue of survivorship; it does not form part of the deceased's estate for intestacy
purposes.
104. AEA, ibid., s. 46.
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or her statutory legacy under the AEA. In addition, a surviving spouse
may make a further claim for financial provision from the deceased's
estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act
1975105 if the will or intestacy distribution failed to make "reasonable
financial provision" for them. Such claims are not confined to
maintenance, but are based on a more generous test of prevailing
circumstances and, in particular, what the applicant would have received
if the marriage had ended in divorce instead of death.'0 6 Thus, a
surviving spouse may be able to retain the home following the death of
the other spouse, even if they were not originally co-tenants of the
property. However, the absence of specific property rights in the home
arising at the death of a spouse and the implications for a surviving
spouse in terms of shelter and financial security must be regarded as
another weakness in English law.
B. Cohabitants and the Family Home
Given the absence of a comprehensive legal regime for spouses and the
home in English law, it is hardly surprising that unmarried cohabitants
are in an even worse position. In terms of legislation, much depends on
the wording of the relevant statute. For example, the general jurisdiction
to resolve disputes relating to co-owned property under the TLA TA
applies to cohabitants and the family home, whereas specific references
to a "spouse" and the "matrimonial home" in the Insolvency Act 1986
ignore cohabitants on bankruptcy. Other legislation expressly includes
cohabitants by adopting a "status approach,"' whereby couples who
reach the relevant cohabitation threshold are accorded specific spousal
rights and obligations. Despite the fact that non-owning cohabitants do
not enjoy "matrimonial home rights" under the FLA and cannot use the
legislation to secure any protection against third parties, unmarried
105. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, (U.K.), 1975, c. 63, s.
1(1)(a) [Inheritance Act].
106. Ibid., s. 1(2); see also Re Besterman, [1984] 2 All E.R. 656 (C.A.).
107. Gillian Douglas, "Marriage, Cohabitation and Parenthood: From Contract to
Status?" in Katz, Eekelaar & Maclean, supra note 17, at 219.
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couples are entitled to similar occupation orders as spouses."' The court
considers the same broad factors, but also the nature of the parties'
relationship and the length of time they lived together.'0 9 This is vital in
situations of domestic violence, though the level of protection offered
by the FLA depends on marital status. While an occupation order is
mandatory where a spouse or relevant child would suffer significant
harm, this is not the case for cohabitants. Here the court must balance
significant harm to an applicant or relevant child against the harm that
the respondent would suffer if an order were made."' Section 41(2) of
the FLA also states that if the parties are cohabitants the court should
take account of the fact that the couple "have not given each other the
commitment involved in marriage." While we accept that cohabitation
can involve different types of commitment, there are obvious dangers in
implying that couples should be entitled to less legal protection
(especially in cases of domestic violence) merely because they are not
married. In any event, it is doubtful whether English courts have
attached any great significance to this particular provision.
Discrepancies also exist in the succession law context, in particular
where the couple are not co-tenants of the family home and the legal
title holder dies. A surviving cohabitant is in a much more precarious
position than a surviving spouse in these circumstances. Unmarried
cohabitants are excluded from the intestacy regime... and can seek
financial provision from a partner's estate only under the Inheritance
108. FLA, supra note 92, s. 36.
109. Ibid., s. 36(6). Section 62(1)(a) of the FLA defines cohabitants as a man and woman
who are living together as husband and wife, though there is no specified period of
cohabitation. An occupation order under s. 36 is also available between former
cohabitants, defined in s. 62(1)(b) as a couple who are no longer living together as
husband and wife but not including cohabitants who have subsequently married each
other.
110. Ibid., s. 36(8).
111. Section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 does not include cohabitants
within the definition of next-of-kin. The current law does, however, avoid a surviving
partner taking precedence over the deceased's children where he or she has no financial
obligation towards them.
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(Provision for Family and Dependants)tAct 1975"' where they were living
together for at least two years prior to the partner's death. This,
combined with the fact that the applicant can only claim for
maintenance under the Inheritance Act, 113 means that a surviving
cohabitant may be unable to retain the family home on the death of his
or her partner. More generally, the inclusion of unmarried couples in
the Inheritance Act (as well as the FLA) by the legislative yardstick of
living together "as husband and wife" 114 has been held to be gender-
specific, and thus restricted to heterosexual cohabitants."' However,
this may be open to reinterpretation following the decision in Ghaidan
v. Mendoza"6 and the incorporation of the European Convention on
Human Rights"7 into domestic law, which we discuss below." 8
In determining beneficial ownership of the family home on
relationship breakdown or in disputes involving third parties,
cohabitants (opposite-sex or same-sex) must rely on the rules of resulting
and constructive trusts where title to the property is not in joint
names. 9 There is no broad concept of unjust enrichment such as that
112. Supra note 105, s. 1(1)(ba). Failing this, cohabitants can only apply by establishing
that they were being maintained by the deceased, either wholly or partly, immediately
before death; s. 1(1)(e).
113. Ibid., s. 1(2).
114. FLA, supra note 92, ss. 62(1)(a) and (b); Inheritance Act, supra note 105, s. 1(1)(ba).
115. See the decisions in Harrogate Borough Council v. Simpson (1985), [1986] 7:2 Fam.
L.R. (C.A.); Re Watson (Deceased), [1999] 1 Faro. L.R. 878 (Ch. D.) and Fitzpatrick v.
Sterling Housing Association Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 705 (H.L.) [Fitzpatrick].
116. [2002] 4 All E.R. 1162 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)) [Mendoza], overruling the House of Lords
decision on this particular point in Fitzpatrick, ibid.
117. 4 November 1950, U.N.T.S. 222.
118. See Part H.F, below.
119. The constructive trust is used more often in practice. Under a resulting trust, the
beneficial interest is quantified by the sum that the claimant contributed to the purchase
of the property; under a constructive trust, the deciding factor is not the amount of
contributions, but the common intention between the parties as to how the beneficial
interest was to be shared. Cohabitants may also attempt to use the doctrine of proprietary
estoppel in these circumstances, though this creates practical difficulties in terms of
establishing the requisite representation or assurance from the property owner, as well as
the associated detriment, by the claimant. See e.g. Lissimore v. Downing, [2003] 2 Fam.
L.R. 308 (Ch. D.) (a generalized promise of future support was not a sufficient
representation, while "detriment" necessitated conduct beyond what might normally be
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which underpins the Canadian model;120 instead, the focus in Britain is
on monetary input.' 2 ' In practice, the majority of claims by unmarried
cohabitants are made under the presumed intention constructive trust
where the court implies an intention to share in the beneficial interest in
the home on the basis of conduct. Roundly criticized by a majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Pettkus v. Becker' 2 some twenty-five
years ago-and in particular by Dickson J, who described it as a "judicial
quest for [a] fugitive common intention"' 23-the presumed intention
constructive trust is still a key feature of English law. While cases such
as Lloyds Bank plc v. Rosset 24 initially insisted on a direct contribution to
the purchase price by the non-owning cohabitant as evidence of
common intention to share beneficial ownership in the family home,
judges will now consider indirect financial contributions over the course
of the relationship. The decision in Oxley v. Hiscock 121 provides a recent
illustration. In that case, an unmarried couple pooled their money to
buy a home and registered ownership in the sole name of the male
partner. The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate method of
assessment was to look at the whole course of dealing between the
couple and the contributions, financial and otherwise, made by each
after the purchase of the home. This included contributions by the
female partner towards household expenditure as well as improvements
to and maintenance of the property. 26 However, it is still the case that
non-monetary contributions such as domestic labour and child-rearing
are disregarded under the presumed intention constructive trust. Again,
expected of the relationship between the parties); Re Bursill (Deceased), [2003] W.T.L.R.
779.
120. Though this, as we have mentioned, is not without its critics. See Part I.B, above.
121. For an overview of the relevant principles, see Anna Lawson, "The Things We Do
For Love: Detrimental Reliance in the Family Home" (1996) 16 L.S. 218; Nicola Glover
& Paul Todd, "The Myth of Common Intention" (1996) 16 L.S. 325; John Mee, The
Property Rights of Cohabitees (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), c. 5-6.
122. (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
123. Ibid. at 269.
124. [1991] 1 A.C. 107 (H.L.). See also Springette v. Defoe, [1992] 2 Fam. L.R. 388 (C.A.).
125. [2004] 2 Fam. L.R. 546 (Civil Div.) and applied in Cox v. Jones, [2004] E.W.H.C.
1486 (Ch. Div.).
126. For earlier illustrations, see Midland Bank plc v. Cooke, [1995] 4 All E.R. 562 (C.A.);
Le Foe, supra note 86.
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this does not compare favourably with the Canadian unjust enrichment
constructive trust, where such contributions are taken into account.
In applying the law of trusts to the family home in Britain, judges can
only ascertain and quantify the beneficial interest of each cohabitant;
they cannot alter this interest to take account of the couple's post-
separation needs. Even if a cohabitant succeeds in establishing a
beneficial interest, he or (more often) she does not automatically keep
possession of the home, or regain possession if he or she has already
vacated the property. While spouses have a discretionary regime for re-
adjusting their respective property entitlements in the home on judicial
separation or divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the
absence of comparable redistributive powers for cohabitants on
relationship breakdown, combined with the fact that there are no
support obligations between the couple, leaves them in a more
vulnerable position when their relationship ends. The only apparent
concession to family law values in this context is the Children Act
1989,"'7 which permits courts to make an order transferring or settling
property between unmarried cohabitants for the benefit of a minor
child. The underlying policy is quite clear: children need stability and
continuity in their upbringing and the Children Act 1989 facilitates this
in relation to the family home. However, this discretionary power will
not be used to confer an indirect windfall on a non-owning
cohabitant;'28 the most that he or she can expect as the custodial parent
is to remain in the home until the youngest child attains the age of 21,
after which the property will be divided under the property law
framework. Despite such limitations, this is a significant improvement
on the Canadian position, where there is no provision for children in
property distribution at the end of a cohabiting relationship.
C. Protecting Autonomy Versus the Needfor a Functional Approach
How do we account for the distinction in English law between the
property rights of married spouses and unmarried cohabitants? The
traditional view of marriage as a special and privileged institution that
127. (U.K.), 1989, c. 41, s. 15, Sch. 1.
128. T v. S. (Family Provision for Children), [1994] 2 Fam. L.R. 883 (Fam. Div.).
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
forms the basis of family life in Britain still holds sway, with a pro-
marriage stance reflected in certain Labour government policies and law
reform initiatives.129 Another key factor is respect for autonomy, which
dictates that couples who have deliberately chosen to avoid marriage
and its attendant consequences should not have "undesired norms of
behavior" 3' imposed on them by the state simply because their
relationship is judged to be qualitatively similar to marriage. The fact
that cohabitation may be regarded as a form of intimate family
relationship with emotional and financial consequences, not just for the
couple themselves but for any children, is irrelevant. The perceived need
to respect the autonomous choice of the individuals concerned prevails,
so that a different legal framework for determining their rights and
responsibilities is perfectly acceptable. However, changing social trends
suggest that this view is no longer tenable.
A decline in marriage has been accompanied by a rapid growth in
cohabitation as an alternative partnering and parenting arrangement in
Britain.13" ' Recent figures show that over 50 percent of couples in Britain
live together before marriage and that more than 24 percent of live
births are to cohabiting couples.1 2 Yet, the current legal framework
129. See e.g. U.K., Home Office, Supporting Families (Consultation Paper) (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1998), online: Home Office < http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
docs/suppfam.html > at para. 4.8: "[Mlarriage does provide a strong foundation for
stability for the care of children. It also sets out rights and responsibilities for all
concerned. It remains the choice of the majority of people in Britain. For all these
reasons, it makes sense for the Government to do what it can to strengthen marriage."
See also U.K., Law Society of England and Wales, Cohabitation: The Case for a Clear Law:.
Proposals for Reform (London: Law Society, 2002) at 4, online: LawSociety
< http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/file/132552/d:/teamsite-deployed/documents//
templatedata/Internet%2ODocuments/Government%20proposals/Documents/cohabitati
onbackground2002.pdf > [Proposals for Reform].
130. Tee, supra note 4 at 46.
131. For an excellent overview, see Anne Barlow & Grace James, "Regulating Marriage
and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain" (2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 143. See also Rebecca
Probert, "Cohabitation in Twentieth Century England and Wales: Law and Policy"
(2004) 26 Law & Pol'y 13.
132. Proposals for Reform, supra note 129 at 7-8. No figures were available for same-sex
couples. For an overview of changing population trends in Britain in the latter half of the
twentieth century, see Colin Gibson, "Changing Family Patterns in England and Wales
over the Last Fifty Years" in Katz, Eekelaar & Maclean, supra note 17, c. 2.
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seems ill-equipped to deal with this social reality, with the law of trusts
attracting the most criticism. Research carried out in 2000 revealed that
almost 60 percent of opposite-sex cohabitants were living together in an
owner-occupied family home, yet in 44 percent of these cases, title to
the home was vested in the name of one partner only.' Thus, more and
more couples are being forced to rely on resulting and constructive
trusts to determine ownership of the family home on relationship
breakdown, even though the relevant law ignores the functional
similarities between cohabitation and marriage and produces potentially
disparate and inequitable results.' On the breakdown of a marriage,
courts can look at both financial and non-financial contributions
towards the family, and will now weigh these equally when dividing
family assets. According to Lord Nicholls in White v. White, "[i]f, in
their different sphere, [the husband and wife] each contributed equally
to the family, then in principle it matters not which of them earned the
money and built up the assets. There should be no bias in favour of the
money-earner and against the home-maker and child-carer."' In
contrast, cohabitants must earn a beneficial interest in the family home
on the basis of financial contributions alone; non-monetary
contributions by a non-owning partner are simply discounted as the
"normal altruism which familial contributions engender at no cost." 136
Craig Rotherham has remarked that the relevant law is based on an
absolutist concept of property. He argues that adherence to strict rules
of property law is an inefficient and unjust mechanism for resolving
133. Anne Barlow et al., "Just a Piece of Paper? Cohabitation and Marriage" in Alison
Park et al., eds., British Social Attitudes (London: Sage Publications, 2002) at 29-57.
134. For criticisms of the existing law, see Glover & Todd, supra note 121; Simon
Gardner, "Re-Thinking Family Property" (1993) 109 Law Q. Rev. 263; Simone Wong,
"Constructive Trusts over the Family Home: Lessons to be Learned from Other
Commonwealth Jurisdictions" (1998) 18 L.S. 369. For a rare argument in favour of the
use of trusts law, see Rebecca Bailey-Harris, "Dividing the Assets on Breakdown of
Relationships Outside Marriage" in Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ed., Dividing the Assets on
Family Breakdown (Bristol: Family Law, 1998), c. 2.
135. Supra note 102 at 989.
136. Anne Barlow, "Rights in the Family Home: Time for a Conceptual Revolution?" in
Alastair Hudson, ed., New Perspectives on Property Law: Human Rights and the Home"
(London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003) at 59.
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disputes between unmarried couples because it is "predicated on a view
of human behavior that is not consistent with the social practices found
in intimate relationships."' Cohabitants do not think in terms of quasi-
contractual arrangements and reward for contributions during the
course of their relationship, yet these "cold legal question[s] " '38 are
central to ascertaining their respective interests in the home on
relationship breakdown. Recourse to resulting and, more often,
constructive trusts makes for lengthy and costly legal battles with
unpredictable outcomes, while the emphasis on financial contribution
prejudices economically weaker cohabitants and has led to allegations of
inherent gender bias against female partners." 9 Judges have occasionally
attempted to import familial considerations into this property law
framework by evaluating cohabitants' contributions in light of their
relationship and domestic circumstances. Recent cases have adopted a
more holistic approach, with courts looking at direct and indirect
financial contributions over the whole course of the relationship and
determining the respective shares in the home accordingly.140 This has
produced a unique branch of trusts law, one which Anne Barlow has
described as "unnecessarily complex, illogical and often unjust," as
judges struggle to balance the need for a "coherent property law
doctrine against the expectations of family law style justice" between the
137. Craig Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002)
at 228.
138. Gissing v. Gissing, [1971] A.C. 886 at 901, Lord Dilhorne (quoting Gissing v.
Gissing, [1969] 2 Ch. 85 at 93, Denning M.R.).
139. See Anne Bottomley, "Self and Subjectivities: Languages of Claim in Property Law"
(1993) 20:1 J.L. & Soc'y 56; Simone Wong, "Property Rights for Home-Sharers: Equity
Versus a Legislative Framework" in Susan Scott-Hunt & Hilary Lim, eds., Feminist
Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2001) c. 7, both of
which argue that the rules of trusts reflect a male model of behaviour with their emphasis
on agreements and financial contributions. However, it has been suggested that female
contributions (both domestic and financial) within relationships are often
underestimated. See Rebecca Probert, "Cohabitants and the Family Home" (2000) 30
Family Law 925 at 928.
140. See e.g. Midland Bank Plc. v. Cooke, supra note 126; Le Foe, supra note 86; Oxley v.
Hiscock, [2004] E.W.C.A. 546 (Civ. Div.); Cox v. Jones, [2004] E.W.H.C. 1486, 3 F.C.R.
693 (Ch. D.).
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parties. 41 Again, the overall result appears similar to that obtained in
Canada, despite some variations in the formal doctrine. The same
criticisms have been levied at the unjust enrichment constructive trust in
light of the onerous requirements that it places on cohabitants seeking
to establish an interest in the family home, and the fact that the inherent
judicial discretion makes for few easily discernible patterns.
While Britain has been much more tentative than the Canadian
provinces in tackling the issue of reform, criticisms of the current legal
framework, combined with the exponential growth in unmarried
cohabitation, have provided a new impetus for change. More worrying
is a survey carried out in June 2004, which revealed that many couples
were still unaware of the legal consequences of cohabitation; 61 percent
of those questioned believed that they enjoyed the same legal rights as
spouses after living together for five years. The survey has spurred a
government campaign to inform citizens on the issue.'42 Before these
latest figures, various proposals had already been put forward for
remedying the defects in the existing law, ranging from a variant of the
trusts-based approach to a new status-based approach, recognizing the
functional similarities between marriage and cohabitation and
conferring analogous rights and duties on unmarried couples. As the
following section illustrates, the emphasis has now shifted firmly
towards the latter approach. However, like the reforms which have
been implemented in Canada, each of the proposals mooted in Britain
creates its own particular set of problems.
D. From Property to Status: Proposalsfor Reform
(i) An Enhanced Property Framework
In the 1970s, the Law Commission for England and Wales was
assigned the task of recommending reforms to property rights in the
141. Barlow, supra note 136 at 53. See also Tee, supra note 4 at 58-59.
142. Clare Dyer, "Campaign debunks cohabitation myth" The Guardian (15 July 2004),
online: Guardian Unlimited < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/
0,,1261467,00.html>.
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home.143 The Commission recommended a scheme of statutory co-
ownership for the matrimonial home as a means of shifting the
emphasis away from financial contributions. 44 Despite its laudable aims,
this presumption of equal sharing was criticized on the grounds that it
perpetuated economic inequality between spouses and was too far-
reaching. 4 ' By focusing solely on married couples, the proposals also
ignored the emergence of cohabitation as an alternative social structure
to marriage. In response, the Law Commission went beyond the issue of
conjugal cohabitants by shifting its attention to the property rights of
homesharers in general. This response was reflected in its long-awaited
discussion paper, Sharing Homes, released in July 2002.146
Sharing Homes contemplated a property-based approach for
determining the rights of all those who share homes, 47 whereby courts
would assess the economic value of financial and non-financial
contributions according to a specific legislative scheme in an attempt to
143. The Law Commission is an independent body set up by Parliament in 1965 to
review continually the law in England and Wales and to recommend reforms where
appropriate; see online: Law Commission for England and
Wales < http://www.lawcom.gov.uk >.
144. See Law Commission for England and Wales, First Report on Family Property: A
New Approach (No. 52) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973); Law
Commission for England and Wales, Third Report on Property Law: The Matrimonial
Home (Co-ownership and Occupation Rights) and Household Goods (No. 86) (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978) and the subsequent Matrimonial Homes (Co-
Ownership) Bill 1980.
145. Ruth Deech, "Williams and Glyn's and Family Law" (1980) 130 New L.J. 896; W.
Tim Murphy & Richard W. Rawlings, "The Matrimonial Homes (Co-ownership) Bill:
The Right Way Forward" (1980) 40 Family Law 136.
146. Sharing Homes, supra note 5. However, the principle of statutory co-ownership still
has some support: see Anne Barlow & Craig Lind, "A Matter of Trust: The Allocation of
Rights in the Family Home" (1999) 19 L.S. 468, which proposes a modified community
of property regime for persons in intimate family relationships, with beneficial
entitlements in the home accumulating in proportion to the duration of the relationship.
147. The discussion paper covered a broad range of homesharers, including spouses
(although not on judicial separation or divorce) and unmarried couples, as well as
relatives and friends living together "for reasons of companionship or care and support,'
where the parties occupied the property as a home and one of them had an interest in the
property. Sharing Homes, ihid. at vi. It did not extend to commercial relationships such as
landlord and tenant.
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promote "certainty and predictability" in the relevant law.'48 The nature
of the relationship between the parties would be irrelevant in making
this assessment; each would receive a beneficial interest in the home
commensurate to his or her respective contribution.'49 On one hand, the
emphasis on property and rewarding contributions seemed to accord
with individualistic norms of modern relationships, in that homesharers
could leave the relationship with what they had brought to it. However,
attempts to apply the proposed system served only to highlight its
inherent weakness. An impartial scheme that did not differentiate
between different types of relationships was unworkable in practice,
simply because it was not sufficiently flexible to deal with the diversity
of relations between homesharers.s ° In short, "one size could not fit
all."' Abandoning the proposals, the Commission was forced to revert
to the existing framework of resulting and constructive trusts. The
Commission acknowledged that this framework was unsatisfactory and
in need of reform, but recommended that judges counter some of these
criticisms by adopting a broader approach towards quantifying
beneficial entitlements in the home. 1
2
The Law Commission's fixation on applying a property framework to
the home is perhaps understandable, given that it was considering the
rights of homesharers in general and seeking to adopt a universally
applicable scheme. However, such a wide-ranging approach ignores the
realities of domestic relationships, and cohabitation in particular. The
home has a unique position at the centre of family life, and the
relationship between cohabitants is relevant in ascertaining their
intentions regarding ownership of the property. While the Law
Commission did mention the possibility of a status-based approach,
whereby rights and obligations would be imposed on cohabitants by
148. Ibid. at viii.
149. The proposed scheme is set out in detail in Part III of the discussion paper. For an
overview, see Rebecca Probert, "Sharing Homes: A Long-Awaited Paper" (2002) 32
Family Law 834; Stuart Bridge, "Sharing Homes: Property or Status" in Elizabeth Cooke,
ed., Modern Studies in Property Law, vol. 2 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), c. 19.
150. Sharing Homes, supra note 6 at 70.
151. Bridge, supra note 149 at 387.
152. As noted earlier, there is already some evidence of this in the case law; see Part
II.C., above.
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labeling their relationship as familial and legislating accordingly, it
concluded that this raised important issues of social policy that were
beyond its remit and should be dealt with by the government.
113
(ii) Enhanced Legal Protection for Cohabitants
In the same month that Sharing Homes was released, the Law Society
of England and Wales published specific proposals for reform of the law
governing unmarried cohabitation." 4 The Law Society began by
recognizing "the need to retain the status of marriage in law, as
demonstrating a particularly high level of commitment."' 5 However, it
proposed that the current ad hoc legal regime for determining the rights
and duties of unmarried couples should be replaced with a more rational
and structured system covering a range of areas, including property and
financial entitlements on relationship breakdown, as well as limited
succession rights. Cohabitants would automatically qualify where they
had been living together as a couple for at least two years or had a
"relevant child," the child serving as proof of stability and commitment
in the relationship irrespective of the period of cohabitation.'56
Regarding disputes involving the family home, the Law Society was of
the opinion that these should be dealt with under family law instead of
153. Sharing Homes, supra note 6 at ix. Recent proposals from the Women and Equality
Unit address some of these concerns, and the government has also recently asked the Law
Commission to look specifically at the rights of unmarried cohabitants.
154. Proposalsfor Reform, supra note 129. The Law Society is the professional body that
represents solicitors practising in England and Wales. See online: Law Society of England
and Wales <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/home.law>.
155. Proposals for Reform, ibid. at 4.
156. Ibid. at Part II. A "relevant child" was defined as; a biological child; offspring born
by assisted reproduction licensed by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
(U.K.), 1990, c. 37; an adopted child; and a child born as the result of a non-commercial
surrogacy agreement, as well as a child in respect of whom there existed a joint residence
order in favour of the parties, ibid. at 13. While adoption in Britain was previously
confined to married couples and single persons, this has now changed under the Adoption
and Children Act 2002 (U.K.), 2002, c. 38, s. 50, which states that an adoption order may
be made in respect of a couple where both have attained the age of 21. The absence of any
marriage requirement combined with the use of gender-neutral language suggests that
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples will be able to apply to adopt a child.
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property law and trusts. It proposed that courts should have the power
to make property adjustment orders with respect to the home, with
judges taking account of any economic advantage derived by one party
from the other's contributions and any economic disadvantages suffered
by either party in the interests of the other party or the family.157
Turning to the post-mortem context, the Law Society claimed that the
current law provided adequate redress for cohabitants on the death of a
partner, but recommended that same-sex couples have the same rights as
opposite-sex couples when making a family provision claim under the
Inheritance Act.' 8
While no further action has been taken on these measures, they were
nevertheless useful in stimulating debate on an already topical issue.
Moreover, the proposals were intended to operate alongside a separate
system of civil partnership registration, which the Law Society
suggested should be created for same-sex couples to give them rights
similar to those of married couples. This has now been achieved in
Britain.
(iii) Creation of a New Civil Status: Proposals for Registered
Partnerships
The Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill159 and the Civil Partnership
Bill 60 were introduced as private members' bills before the British
Parliament in October 2001 and January 2002, respectively. 61 Like their
157. Proposals for Reform, ibid. at 59-61. This particular test was derived from the
wording of the Family Law (Scotland)Act 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 37. Section 9(2) of that Act
states that economic advantage means "advantage gained whether before or during the
marriage and includes gains in capital, in income and in earning capacity" and that
economic disadvantage should be construed accordingly.
158. Proposals for Reform, ibid. at 71-72.
159. Bill 36, Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill, 2001-2002 Sess., 2001.
160. Bill 41, Civil Partnership Bill [HL], 2001-2002 Sess., 2002.
161. The primary method of enacting legislation in the United Kingdom is by means of
bills introduced by the government. However, there is also a procedure whereby private
members of Parliament, or backbenchers, can initiate bills that may ultimately lead to
legislation. The Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill was introduced in the House of
Commons by Jane Griffiths MP, while the Civil Partnership Bill was introduced in the
House of Lords by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC.
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corresponding models in Manitoba and Nova Scotia, both Bills
proposed systems for registering opposite and same-sex cohabiting
relationships. Registration would trigger the conferral of substantive
rights and duties similar to those associated with marriage, with
provision for dissolution of the registered partnership and a consequent
redistribution of property. 16 The Civil Partnership Bill was the more far-
reaching of the two in this respect, suggesting that "communal
property" such as the home should be regarded as being held jointly by
cohabitants, but with express powers for courts to make an
"intervention order" requiring a property transfer or variation of a pre-
existing property agreement on relationship breakdown. To this end,
the Bill made specific reference to prescribed factors similar to those
taken into account on dissolution of a marriage. 163 Both Bills also
proposed enhanced rights for registered cohabitants on the death of a
partner, placing them in a similar position to spouses for the purposes of
both intestacy distribution and family provision claims, albeit without
any specific provision for the family home. However, neither measure
was carried forward; the Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill fell victim
to parliamentary time constraints, while the Civil Partnership Bill was
withdrawn pending a government review of such schemes.
In November 2003, the Women and Equality Unit published a
consultation paper 164 detailing the government's proposals for civil
partnerships, but for same-sex couples only. It proposed the creation of
a new legal status of "registered partner" for same-sex couples where
both are at least 16, with registration conferring rights and obligations
equivalent to those of married couples. The aim was to provide a
framework "whereby same-sex couples could acknowledge their mutual
162. While the Civil Partnership Bill stipulated that both partners in the couple must
have attained the age of 18 and must have lived together in the same household for at
least six months before the application for registration, the Relationships (Civil
Registration) Bill did not stipulate any qualifying period of cohabitation, stating merely
that both parties must have attained the age of 16.
163. For an overview of the Civil Partnership Bill, see Kerry Fretwell, "Enhanced Rights
for Cohabitants" (2002) 152 New L.J. 233.
164. Responses to Civil Partnership: a frameworkfor the legal recognition of same-sex couples
online: http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/publications/CP-responses.pdf [Women
and Equality Unit Paper]
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responsibilities, manage their financial arrangements and achieve
recognition as each other's partner." 165 Couples would be able to register
and solemnize their relationship in a civil ceremony by signing a
document in front of two witnesses and a registration officer, having
given the requisite notice of registration. 166 Registration would result in
a series of specified rights and responsibilities, not only during the
relationship, but on its breakdown or the death of a registered
partner. 16  The proposals also contemplated a formal, court-based
dissolution process where the registered partnership had broken down
irretrievably. In these circumstances, courts would have discretionary
powers to deal with property disputes between the parties (such as those
relating to the family home), taking account of their needs and the needs
of any children, with the aim of providing the couple with "the
property rights appropriate to family relationships."'68 Where the
relationship ended by death, registered partners would have the same
rights on intestacy and family provision claims as married spouses. The
Women and Equality Unit went to considerable lengths to stress that it
was not proposing same-sex marriage, but a separate civil partnership
registration scheme. 69 By recommending a distinct scheme of analogous
legal rights for same-sex couples, instead of simply allowing them to opt
into existing matrimonial statutes (as in Nova Scotia), the proposals
maintained the legal sanctity of marriage.
The resulting Civil Partnership Act 2004170 was passed in November
2004 and is due to come into force in late 2005. This is a significant
achievement, given that other "homosexual positive" legislation has
165. Ibid. at 13.
166. Ibid. at 23. There is no minimum requirement for the duration of the relationship.
However, registration is prohibited where either party is already married or the parties in
the couple are related "by close blood or half blood ties, adoption ... or [are] related by
degrees of affinity." Ibid. at 19-20.
167. Ibid. at Part B.
168. Ibid. at 50.
169. Ibid. at 13.
170. (U.K.), 2004, c. 33. The main provisions are contained in Part 2 of the Act, which
prescribes the relevant formalities for registration and dissolution of registered
partnerships in Britain and the various property and financial arrangements that apply.
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been fiercely resisted in Britain in the past.' The Act will impact
significantly on ownership of the family home between same-sex
couples: courts will be able to make property adjustment orders on
dissolution of a registered partnership, while enhanced succession rights
will give a surviving registered partner a greater chance of retaining the
property where title is not in joint names. More generally, the proposals
will vastly improve the position of same-sex couples by granting them
legal recognition as a social group in their own right and essentially
equating them to married couples. Same-sex couples will no longer be
forced to invoke quasi-constitutional guarantees of equality under the
Human Rights Act 1998.72 as a means of challenging existing laws and
thereby securing enhanced rights. Respect for individual choices is a key
theme in the consultation paper. Like marriage, registered civil
partnership is a voluntarily assumed legal status: same-sex couples must
opt into the scheme. The government's refusal to extend the proposals
to opposite-sex couples is likewise premised on notions of autonomy:
homosexual couples cannot avail themselves of the marriage option,
whereas heterosexual couples can.
E. The Elusive Legal Panacea in Britain
In seeking to devise an appropriate legal framework for cohabitants,
English law has been constrained by two factors noted above: respect
for autonomy, and the perceived need to preserve the unique legal
consequences of marriage. Neither sits easily with arguments for
equating marriage and cohabitation on the basis of functional similarity.
As far as the family home is concerned, there is also a struggle between
property law, with its focus on past actions and contributions, and
171. Emma Hitchings, "Mendoza v. Ghaidan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back"
(2003) 15 Child and Family Law Quarterly 313 at 325. Among other things, this article
discusses attempts to repeal section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 (U.K.), 1988,
c. 9. The section prohibited local authorities from publishing material promoting
homosexuality and from promoting the teaching in schools that homosexuality is
acceptable.
172. (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
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family law, with its emphasis on status and future need.1" With respect
to enjoyment of the family home, the emphasis has gradually shifted
towards family law through statutory provisions that recognize its
shelter and security aspects. However, the position is different with
regard to ownership of the home. Here, English law has traditionally
privileged property law over family law by its tendency to treat the
home as any other asset, with the emphasis on land as a form of
investment enshrined in the Law of Property Act 192574 by virtue of the
trust for sale. There is no specific legal framework for the home on the
death of a spouse or partner, or in respect of inter vivos transactions by
one spouse or cohabitant in favour of a third party. In this respect,
Britain does not compare favourably with other common law
jurisdictions, including Canada. During marriage, the state of title to the
matrimonial home is relevant and there is no community of property
regime; it is only on judicial separation or divorce that family law
principles impact on ownership through the court's redistributivepowers. Yet, unmarried couples are at an added disadvantage, given that
judges have no comparable discretionary powers for readjusting
property entitlements in the family home when their relationship ends
and are confined to the law of trusts.
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 addresses some of these concerns in that
it introduces redistributive powers for same-sex registered partners on
relationship breakdown, as well as increased rights on the death of a
registered partner. However, it does not solve all of the problems within
the current legal framework. While intended to bring same-sex couples
out of the legal wilderness in which they have languished for many
years, gay rights groups have criticized the proposals for not going far
173. See generally Rebecca Probert, "Family Law and Property Law: Competing
Spheres in the Regulation of the Family Home" in Hudson, supra note 136, c. 2; Joanna
Miles, "Property Law v. Family Law: Resolving the Problems of Family Property" (2003)
23:4 L.S. 624.
174. (U.K.), 1925, c. 20. Under the Act, sale was viewed as the primary goal of co-
ownership with the emphasis on realizing the economic value of land. The trust for sale
has now been replaced by the trust of land under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996, so that co-owners retain an interest in the land itself rather than its
capital value- for a useful overview, see L. Fox, "Living In A Policy State: From Trust for
Sale to Trust of Land" (2000) 22 Liverpool Law Review 59.
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enough; registered partnerships are viewed as qualitatively equivalent to
marriage yet result in a separate and secondary legal status.' While the
Civil Partnership Act 2004 may remove same-sex marriage from the
political agenda for the time being, it might still become an issue as it
has in Canada. More generally, the Act will lead to a three-way approach
towards property disputes involving the shared home in conjugal-type
relationships: spouses can avail of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 on
divorce or judicial separation; registered partners will have a similar
mechanism for determining their respective property entitlements in the
home on dissolution of the partnership; and both groups will have the
full range of succession rights available to them on the death of a spouse
or partner. However, same-sex couples who do not opt into the scheme
and, more importantly, opposite-sex couples to whom it does not apply,
are in exactly the same legal position as before and will find themselves
at the bottom of a three-tiered system of regulation. The proposals have
been criticized for placing homosexual couples in a much stronger legal
position than unmarried heterosexual couples, 17 6 who would also benefit
from a definitive framework of interdependent rights and obligations
instead of the current system of piecemeal statutory concessions.
The major policy issue in Britain in the future will likely be the rights
of opposite-sex couples and, perhaps to a lesser extent, same-sex couples
who have failed to register their relationships. Looking first at opposite-
sex couples, what are the options for reform? One is to extend the civil
partnership proposals to opposite-sex couples, but this is an unlikely
scenario given the government's reluctance to include them in the
scheme because of their alternative option to marry."' That aside, the
Nova Scotia experience suggests that few such couples would actually
register their relationship even if they had the option. Another
possibility mooted by Anne Barlow and Grace James 178 is that of a
175. See Angelique Chrisafis, "Legislation for same-sex couples aimed at forcing culture
change" The Guardian (1 July 2003), online: Guardian Unlimited
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gayrights/story/0,12592, 9 8 8 61 6 ,0O.html>.
176. Ibid. See also "New rights for gay couples" BBC News Service (U.K. Edition) (30 June
2003), online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uknews/politics/
3031332.stm >.
177. See Part II.E, above.
178. See Barlow & James, supra note 131 at 171-172.
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looser French PaCS-style model, which would encourage couples to
agree on the terms of their relationship while avoiding wholesale
marriage-like rights and responsibilities. Under this model, opposite-sex
cohabitants could subscribe to a form of committed "coupledom"
(terminable on two months' notice), which would attract marriage-like
tax and succession rights and also allow property agreements to be
registered while presuming joint ownership in default. However, the
same basic problem would remain: couples who neglect to register their
relationships, or cannot do so because one partner (often the
economically stronger one) discourages registration, would be excluded.
The obvious alternative is to introduce a separate layer of regulation
for unmarried couples in the form of specific rights and duties, which
could also extend to same-sex couples who choose not to enter into a
civil partnership. This could be done by giving these couples exactly the
same legal entitlements as married spouses. Research suggests that there
is strong support for assimilation."7 9 Recent figures showing a
surprisingly widespread but mistaken belief in the existence of
"common-law marriage" in Britain 80 lend credence to these findings.
Another way is to extend certain spousal rights and obligations to
unmarried couples, perhaps along the lines of the measures suggested by
the Law Society, but stopping short of equating the two groups and thus
preserving the notion of marriage as a legally distinct institution.
Introducing a form of legislative "safety-net" would benefit vulnerable
partners, as well as couples who were ignorant of the legal consequences
of unmarried cohabitation or perhaps unable to formalize their
relationship due to the existence of some legal impediment. 8' It would
have to set an appropriate threshold for legally recognized
cohabitation-for example, living together for at least two years or
procreation, either one serving as an indicator of stability and
179. Ibid. at 163.
180. Dyer, supra note 142.
181. The most obvious example being where one of the couple is still married to
someone else and has not yet divorced his or her spouse.
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commitment within the relationship." 2 This nebulous concept of
qualifying cohabitation would require some intrusion into a couple's
living arrangements-for example, asking such questions as when
exactly did cohabitation begin, and have the partners lived together for
the relevant period?"8 3  Any such framework would also have
implications for third parties who may not know the extent of
cohabitants' rights, while more serious issues are raised by couples who
are opposed to marriage and deliberately chose cohabitation as a means
of avoiding the inter-dependent rights and obligations associated with it.
Should arguments based on equality and the protection of economically
weaker or emotionally vulnerable cohabitants outweigh the right to
make autonomous choices, especially where couples are vehemently
opposed to the imposition of quasi-spousal obligations? Stuart Bridge
has remarked:
[t]his will require an assessment of the extent to which the autonomy of the parties to
come to their own arrangements should be compromised by the necessity for
paternalistic intervention-in short whether it is now necessary to impose on parties to a
particular kind of relationship a legal status irrespective of their wishes.'1
4
Whether English law decides to abandon individual responsibility in
favour of such collective intervention remains to be seen, though there
are tentative signs of government support for the latter approach. The
fact that 61 percent of those questioned in a recent survey assumed that
unmarried couples have the same legal rights as spouses has prompted a
government-funded campaign to dispel this myth and to advise
cohabitants of the limitations on their rights, especially on death and
182. The two year period is the outer time limit favoured by the Law Society and which
occurs in various statutes regulating unmarried cohabitation, including the Inheritance
Act.
183. In terms of what constitutes living together in the same household, for example,
Judge Norris QC proposed the following guideline in Churchill v. Roach, [2004] Fain.
L.R. 989, [2003] W.T.L.R. 779 (Ch. D.): "It seems.. . to have elements of permanence, to
involve a consideration of the frequency and intimacy of contact, to contain an element
of mutual support, to require some consideration of the degree of voluntary restraint
upon personal freedom which each party undertakes, and to involve an element of
community of resources."
184. Bridge, supra note 149 at 392.
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relationship breakdown." 5 In the meantime, the government has asked
the Law Commission to look at the rights of unmarried heterosexual
couples and to draw up* fundamental reforms, including inheritance
rights and support obligations." 6 Where this leaves same-sex couples
who fail to register their relationship under the forthcoming civil
partnership scheme is far from clear.
There is no single solution to the many issues raised by unmarried
cohabitation, and Britain may have to experiment with a variety of legal
mechanisms to get the best result, perhaps using a combination of opt-in
rights and rights that are attained automatically upon reaching a
specified threshold, which is similar to the situation in Manitoba. This
seems to be happening, in light of the proposals for registered
partnerships and the more recent referral to the Law Commission. It is
interesting that both of these are proactive government measures and
not merely reactions to legal challenges. However, such challenges are
now a distinct possibility in the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998,17
which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights' into
British law. The following section looks at the key provisions of the
Convention, and discusses how unmarried couples-in particular,
opposite-sex cohabitants-might be able to use these fundamental rights
as a means of arguing for legal parity with married couples with respect
to certain legal entitlements.
F. The Family Home and the European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights was agreed by the Council
of Europe in Rome on November 4, 1950, in response to the violation
185. Dyer, supra note 142. See also the announcement of the Department for
Constitutional Affairs, "Living together but not married? Do you know the legal
implications of cohabitation?" (July 2004), online: Department for Constitutional Affairs
< http://www.dca.gov.uk/family/cohabit.htm >.
186. However, more conservative newspapers have denounced the plans as undermining
the sanctity of marriage. See e.g. Matthew Hickley "Yet Another Labour Reform Moves
to Damage Marriage" Daily Mail (16 July 2004), online: Factiva < http://global.factiva.com/
en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp>.
187. (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
188. U.N.T.S. 222. [Convention].
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of fundamental human rights that engulfed the continent during World
War ]."89 Before October 2000, the Convention's status in English law
was that of an interpretative aid which could be used, for example, to
construe ambiguous legislation, but was not binding on domestic courts.
The Human Rights Act 1998, which came into effect on October 2, 2000,
incorporated the provisions of the Convention into English law. As a
result, it has assumed the status of a quasi-constitutional instrument, as
domestic courts are now bound to act in accordance with and to uphold
Convention values. 90 While some commentators have argued that the
Convention has a purely "vertical effect," being concerned specifically
with relations between an individual and the state,'9 ' the bulk of opinion
suggests that it also has a "horizontal effect" and will influence disputes
of a purely private nature. 92 The impact of the Convention on property
189. See generally Pieter van Dijk & Godefridus. J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 3d ed. (Boston: Kluwer Law International,
1998), c. 1.
190. See generally Dominic McGoldrick, "The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act
1998 in Theory and Practice" (2001) 50 I.C.L.Q. 901.
191. See e.g. Richard Buxton, "The Human Rights Act and Private Law" (2000) 116 Law
Q. Rev 48; Thomas Raphael, "The Problem of Horizontal Effect" (2000) 5 Eur. H.R.L.
Rev. 493.
192. See Murray Hunt, "The 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" (1998)
Public Law 423; Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, 'Horizontal Effect' and the
Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper?" (1999) 62 Mod. L. Rev. 824; William Wade,
"Horizons of Horizontality" (2000) 116 Law Q. Rev. 217; Nicholas Bamforth, "The True
'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act 1998" (2001) 117 Law Q. Rev. 34. S. 3(1) of
the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 stipulates that 'primary legislation and
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights." This suggests that the Convention applies to all statutes whether
public or private in nature and would include legislation relating to the home. See
Phillipson cited above. However, the extent to which the Convention impacts on disputes
governed exclusively by the common law has been the subject of much debate. Section
6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for a "public authority" to act in a
manner that is incompatible with a Convention right, while s. 6(3)(a) specifically includes
a 'court or tribunal" within this definition. Despite suggestions that courts will be
obliged to develop legal principles in accordance with the Convention ('direct" horizontal
effect as suggested by Wade), the bulk of opinion suggests that it will have a less pervasive
effect, with judges merely being influenced by Convention rights and values in developing
the common law ('indirect" horizontal effect as suggested by the other authors cited,
ibid.).
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disputes between cohabitants and, in particular, those relating to the
family home are far from clear. Article 14 states: "The enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, birth or other status."
This list of potential, grounds of discrimination is not an exhaustive
one. However, unlike section 15 of the Canadian Charter and its general
guarantee of equality, Article 14 is parasitic in nature; a claimant must
first invoke another Convention right before alleging discrimination
with respect to the exercise of that right.'93 When considering the family
home, the most obvious example is Article 8, which states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 194
Article 8(1) contemplates effective enjoyment of the home, while
Article 8(2) prescribes the circumstances in which legitimate
interference by the state will be permissible. 95  Moreover, in
193. However, judicial opinions have been divided as to whether there must be an actual
violation of the substantive right claimed in conjunction with Article 14 before the court
can make a finding of discrimination (see Botta v. Italy (1998), 26 E.H.R.R. 241; Smith and
Grady v. United Kingdom, [2000] 29 E.H.R.R. 493), or whether it is sufficient that the
relevant claim merely falls within the material scope of one of the Convention rights
notwithstanding the absence of any breach in order for Article 14 to be engaged. See
Belgian Linguistic (No. 2) (1985), 1 E.H.R.R. 252; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.
United Kingdom (1985), 7 E.H.R.R. 471.
194. For a general overview of Article 8, see Clare Ovey & Robin White, eds., Jacobs
and White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) c. 11. Note that Article 8 guarantees a right to respect for these
various interests, and not a right to the interests themselves. See generally Colin
Warbrick, "The Structure of Article 8" (1998) 1 Eur. H.R.L. Rev. 32.
195. See generally Deborah Rook, Property Law and Human Rights (London: Blackstone
Press, 2001), c. 5.
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determining what constitutes a home, the essential feature is not
ownership, but living in the property as a home." At first glance, it
might seem that Article 8, whether invoked on its own or in
conjunction with Article 14, could provide an effective means of
challenging inconsistencies between the treatment of spouses and
cohabitants within the existing legal framework. However, this has not
been borne out in practice. The focus to date has instead been on
conferring specific legal rights on certain groups, with an indirect
impact on the shared home.
Until recently, transsexuals in Britain who were cohabiting with a
member of their original sex would have been regarded as a same-sex
couple. The decision in Corbett v. Corbett'97 stated that the sex of a
transsexual is that assigned at birth, irrespective of subsequent surgical
intervention. However, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,9 ' the European
Court of Human Rights held that the U.K.'s failure to recognize legally
the reassigned gender of a male to female transsexual in relation to
marriage, employment, social security and pension rights breached the
applicant's right to respect for her private life under Article 8 of the
Convention, as well as the fundamental right of a man and woman to
marry under Article 12" The government responded to the decision in
Goodwin by amending domestic law accordingly under the Gender
Recognition Act 2004.20o Thus, transsexuals can enter into a valid
196. Gillow v. United Kingdom (1989), 11 E.H.R.R. 335. In terms of physical structure,
the obvious example would be a dwelling house, although a caravan has been treated as a
"home" for the purposes of Article 8: Mabey v. United Kingdom (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. 123.
However, the notion of "home" in Article 8 does not extend to property on which it is
intended to build a house for residential purposes, nor does it cover an area of a state in
which an individual has grown up and where his or her family have roots. Loizidou v.
Turkey (1997), 23 E.H.R.R. 513. See also Ian Loveland, "When is a House Not a Home
under Article 8 ECHR?" (Summer 2002) P.L. 221.
197. [19701 2 All E.R. 33 (Prob. Div. Adm.).
198. [20021 35 E.H.R.R. 18, I.L.R. 664 [Goodwin], subsequently applied by the House of
Lords in Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] H.L.J. No. 21, U.K.H.L. 21. For an overview, see
Angus Campbell & Heather Lardy, "Transsexuals: The ECHR in Transition" (2003) 54
N. Ir. Legal Q. 209.
199. Article 12 states: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right."
200. (U.K.), 2004, c. 7.
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marriage with a person of the opposite sex to their reassigned gender,
while couples who choose to cohabit can have access to the various
statutory rights and duties conferred on persons "living together as
husband and wife."20' The exclusion of same-sex couples from this
apparently gender-specific definition" 2 has also been challenged under
the Human Rights Act 1998. Mendoza concerned a claim under the Rent
Act 1977"' by a homosexual partner to succeed to a statutory tenancy of
a dwelling house originally held by his deceased partner. That Act
stipulates that the applicant must have been living with the deceased "as
his or her wife or husband."2" 4 The Court of Appeal held that the
exclusion of homosexual cohabitants constituted discrimination under
Article 14 of the Convention when read in conjunction with Article 8,
which extends to legislation relating to the family home. Sexual
orientation was an impermissible ground of discrimination and, in order
to make the Rent Act 1977 compatible with the Convention, it had to be
construed as including persons in a same-sex relationship. Accordingly,
the reference in the relevant provision to living together "as his or her
wife or husband" should read "as though his or her wife or husband."
20 5
Article 8 of the Convention creates a much more explicit form of
recognition and protection for the home than does the Canadian
Charter. Yet, while it protects enjoyment of the home, there has been
little movement in terms of ownership and substantive property rights.
The right to respect for the home under Article 8 is not a property-
conferring right, and it cannot be used to grant the claimant a
proprietary interest in the home where none already exists.20 6 Any
201. This phrase is taken from the language of the FLA, supra note 92.
202. See Part Ml.E, above.
203. (U.K.), 1977, c. 42.
204. Ibid., Sch. 1, at para. 2(2). There is no specific requirement for the length of the
time that the parties must have been living together.
205. While the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick, supra note 115 had previously rejected a
similar claim under the Rent Act 1977 on the basis that the parties had to be a male and a
female, the decision was rejected in Ghaidan v. Mendoza as pre-dating the implementation
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
206. See Tom Allen, "The Human Rights Act (UK) and Property Law" in Janet
McClean ed., Property and the Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) at 155-156;
(2005) 30 Queen's L.J.
potential impact on ownership of the home is more likely to occur
indirectly, through the conferral of other entitlements affecting the
home of persons in intimate relationships. Following Goodwin,
transsexuals can enter into a legally valid marriage in Britain and thus
avail themselves of associated spousal entitlements on relationship
breakdown and death, including those that relate to the home.
Meanwhile, same-sex couples could use the decision in Mendoza to
challenge other legislation that assumes a heterosexual definition of
cohabitation, such as the Inheritance Act, which allows claims for
financial provision from a deceased partner's estate. However, the
coming into force of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 suggests that this
course of action will be taken only by same-sex couples who fail to
register their relationship and cannot avail themselves of the more
comprehensive rights available to registered partners.
Both Goodwin and Mendoza also illustrate the potential for using
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 to challenge discrepancies in the
relevant legal frameworks governing marriage and cohabitation. It "may
only be a matter of time"" 7 before the functional similarities between
the two social groups raise allegations of discrimination, especially in
relation to unmarried heterosexual couples, who will find themselves at
the bottom of a three-tiered hierarchy when the Civil Partnership Act
2004 takes effect. The absence of a specific statutory framework on
relationship breakdown or special consideration on bankruptcy for
opposite-sex cohabitants might be open to challenge, as could be their
exclusion from the intestacy regime where a spouse's statutory legacy
can include the home if title is not in joint names. Statutory provisions
aside, Article 8 and Article 14 might also influence the development of
the existing property law framework for resolving disputes surrounding
ownership of the home. For example, non-owning female cohabitants
asserting a beneficial interest in the home could argue that the rules of
resulting and constructive trusts, with their emphasis on financial
contribution, constitute gender discrimination. This of course assumes
that English courts will favour equal treatment for married and
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unmarried couples. As the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Walsb illustrates, this may not always be the case. While the right to
marry is enshrined in Article 12 of the Convention, cohabitants can still
choose not to marry, and it is doubtful whether courts in Britain would
allow quasi-constitutional guarantees of equality to encroach on
property entitlements in the home. Another potential argument under
Articles 8 and 14 is for same-sex marriage. Notwithstanding the
proposals for registered partnerships, the fact that same-sex couples
cannot marry might be challenged under Article 12 and Article 14,
despite case-law holding that the existing prohibition on same-sex
marriage does not violate Article 12.2" The fact that similar restrictions
have recently been declared unconstitutional in Canada may eventually
re-open the debate in Britain.
The extent to which the Convention will impact on ownership of the
home in Britain will also depend on how it develops within domestic
law in general. While the Convention does not yet enjoy the almost
iconic status of the Canadian Charter, the former has only been part of
national law for a relatively short time. Both judges and legislators have
not yet fully adapted to the burgeoning human rights culture in Britain
and are still cautiously feeling their way with respect to implementing
the Convention. While it has been used essentially as a reactive means of
challenging deficiencies in the existing law, as in Goodwin and Mendoza,
there is also the possibility that the Convention could adopt a more
proactive role in the future. As the jurisprudence develops, the rights
enshrined in the Convention may become interpretive principles that
influence the ongoing development of the law relating to the family
home, in the same way that Charter values have shaped the development
of the common law in Canada. Thus, the rhetoric of constitutionally
protected values and human rights discourses may eventually prove to
be as useful a tool for promoting change in Britain as substantive rights-
based challenges under the Convention.
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Conclusion
Both Britain and Canada have been struggling to deal with the
emergence of unmarried cohabitation as an alternative family form to
marriage, and the associated strain that this has placed on existing
mechanisms for deciding property rights in the family home. Recent
legislative initiatives in both jurisdictions have focused on same-sex
couples, with proposals for same-sex marriage in Canada and registered
partnerships in Britain, as well as associated statutory provisions for
determining property entitlements in the home. While these measures
will solve some of the problems in the current law, the question
remains: how and to what extent should the respective governments
regulate cohabiting relationships between couples, whether same-sex or,
especially, opposite-sex, who have neglected or declined to avail
themselves of formal regulatory mechanisms?
The ongoing policy debates in Britain and Canada proceed on the basis
that the comparable legal yardstick for cohabitation is marriage. Britain
and the common law Canadian provinces have already extended certain
spousal rights and duties to unmarried couples, particularly in the
context of economic benefits such as social security entitlements and
compensation payments. However, when we turn to property rights
and ownership of the family home, there is an inherent reluctance to
grant cohabitants the same legal entitlements as spouses. Despite
statutory concessions in relation to occupation of the property,
ownership of the family home as between unmarried couples is based
largely on the law of trusts, with its evidential difficulties, inherent
gender bias and unpredictable results. At the heart of this lies a fixation
on property law and a longstanding resistance, particularly in British
jurisprudence, to the idea that need-inflected "family" considerations
should intrude into this hallowed domain. Notwithstanding judicial
attempts in both Britain and Canada to "familialize" the law of trusts to
allow for the social realities of cohabitation and associated domestic
arrangements, judges have in a sense developed the law as far as they
can. Since judges cannot impose a specific and cohesive property regime
for cohabitants, substantive reform is an issue for the legislature to
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address. Yet, while the consensus seems to be that change is necessary,
deciding what form it should take has proven difficult.
Any successful legal regime for determining property entitlements in
the family home between unmarried cohabitants must meet a range of
diverse objectives. On the one hand, there is the notion of respect for
autonomy and the right of individuals in conjugal-type relationships to
opt into state regulation of their affairs. On the other hand, there is the
concept of promoting equality, both within relationships and between
different social groups, and preventing discrimination on the grounds of
marital status, sexual orientation or gender. Against this background, we
have to consider how the law should protect vulnerable family
members, such as economically dependent cohabitants, and whether
paternalistic state intervention is justified in order to achieve this aim.
There is also the issue of how best to promote lifelong, exclusive
relationships and to ensure stability and continuity in family life. These
are important issues in Canada and Britain, where the respective
governments see "stable" families as crucial to a sustainable society.
Personal choice has traditionally been regarded as paramount, and
arguments for reform based on constitutional or quasi-constitutional
guarantees of equal treatment seem to be on hold in both England and
Canada.
Withdrawal of the constitutional prod in cases such as Walsh and in
the jurisprudence from the European Convention on Human Rights
should not cause legislatures to ignore the issue, however. At a
minimum, cohabitants need a legislated regime for post-separation
allocation of possessory rights in the family home that is based on the
best interests of any children. In Britain, this has already been achieved
to some extent by the Children Act 1989, as well as in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, and there are strong arguments for similar statutory
frameworks to be introduced throughout Canada. However, this is only
one small part of the bigger legal picture. The need for a legislative
regime for relationship breakdown in general cannot be overlooked,
with the equality debate re-emerging as one of the driving forces for
reform. Questions also surround the fate of the family home on death
and the legal protections for cohabitants and the home against third
parties. Introduced with much fanfare, the domestic partnership or civil
union model is far from a panacea, especially for opposite-sex
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cohabitants. Nicholas Bala, writing in 2000 (before the Supreme Court's
decision in Walsh), suggested that the development of a more
comprehensive legal regime for cohabitants was "inevitable."2 ° That
may be true, but if so, it will come about through the slow drip of
legislative process rather than a judicially administered jolt of espresso.
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